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## The West

#### Contention 1: The Transatlantic

#### EU recovery’s fake – data doesn’t assume demand-side limits.

**Foroohar 8/15/13** assistance managing editor for Time in charge of economics and business(Rana Foroohar, 15 August 2013, “Europe’s False Recovery,” Time Magazine, http://business.time.com/2013/08/15/europes-false-recovery/)//KP

When is a recovery not a recovery? When it comes in the euro zone. On Wednesday, Europe officially vaulted out of its longest recession since the creation of the single currency, growing 0.3% after shrinking exactly that much in the first quarter. While that still only adds up to 0% growth, European officials are already lauding their “success” and attempting to rebrand their much maligned economic formula of austerity. “The data … supports, in my view, the fundamentals of our crisis response: a policy mix where building a stability culture and pursuing structural reforms supportive of growth and jobs go hand in hand,” said Olli Rehn, the E.U.’s Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs. The markets, desperate for a bit of good news in Europe, are now hoping for more: investors are more bullish on euro-zone equities than at any time since January 2008, according to a monthly fund managers’ poll from Bank of America Merrill Lynch. But a better European stock market presupposes continued economic growth. And if you look closely as the last quarter recovery, it’s built on shaky foundations, like a one-off weather-related rebound (German and French construction picked up after a long, slow, cold winter), as well as a boost in export demand from outside Europe that German manufacturers themselves say probably won’t continue. Credit is still tight, which will constrain business investment, and while consumer spending has picked up a bit, French and German shoppers can’t make up for a lack of demand in countries like Spain, Italy and the Netherlands, which are still in recession. Meanwhile, some 20 million people in the euro zone are still out of a job — a record 12.1%. That’s unlikely to change anytime soon. The problem is as it always has been: an unresolved debt crisis precipitated by an E.U. built on faulty foundations. As I explained recently in a TIME magazine article about how Germany must save the euro to save itself, austerity hasn’t worked at all — and bailouts have merely papered over the fact that the E.U. isn’t an integrated economic union, but rather a collection of states operating on two speeds, with no integrated fiscal policy. “The return to modest rates of economic growth in the euro zone as a whole won’t do much to address the deep-seated economic and fiscal problems of the peripheral countries,” wrote Jonathan Lyons, chief European economist of London-based Capital Economics, in a note to clients. “Indeed, stronger growth in the core could even have some negative effects on the periphery by maintaining an undesirably strong euro and deterring the European Central Bank from providing further monetary stimulus.”

#### Including Mexico in Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations leverages the entire South American market – saves EU and US economies.

**Meacham 7/25** – director of the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C., former senior advisor for Latin America and the Caribbean on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to Senator Richard Lugar (Carl, “The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Mexico Wants In – Why not?”, 7/25/13; < http://csis.org/publication/trans-atlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-mexico-wants-why-not>)//Beddow

On Wednesday, July 24, the CSIS Americas Program hosted Mexico’s ambassador to the United States, Eduardo Medina Mora, to discuss North America’s competitiveness in the global economy. Under this broad umbrella, there has been one question increasingly posed by policymakers in the Western Hemisphere and the private sector alike: why isn’t Mexico part of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations?—and the ambassador affirmed Mexico’s firm support for the country’s inclusion. The negotiations for the TTIP, the long awaited free trade agreement (FTA) between the United States and the European Union (EU), launched two weeks ago. Though the start of the talks were initially marred by intense political tensions caused by the recent revelations of U.S. global espionage operations, both parties decided to move forward, given how much both stand to benefit from the agreement. The agreement aims to remove existing trade barriers on a variety of economic sectors between the EU and the United States in order to promote investment flows, facilitate commerce, and boost economic growth and job creation on both sides of the Atlantic**. If the negotiations are successful, the TTIP will be the biggest trade agreement in history, encompassing 40 percent of global output.** Yet, while **Mexico** is a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), remains among the United States' top three trade partners, and already has an FTA with the European Union to build upon, it **remains on the negotiating sidelines.** And in recent talks at CSIS, including by the National Security Council’s Latin America head as well as the EU’s manager for the Americas, there does not appear to be much interest in including Mexico in talks that are, admittedly, already complex. But **if both the United States and the EU are looking to foster economic growth and employment through trade liberalization, why not transform these EU-U.S. talks into an EU-U.S.-Mexico agreement?** Q1: What does the Mexican economy look like today? What free trade agreements does the country already belong to? A1: While much of the focus on Mexico from the United States remains on security and immigration, it is the country's increasing competitiveness and economic liberalization that merit attention. Mexico, Latin America's second largest economy, is currently a member of 12 different FTAs involving 44 other nations, making it among the most open of the world's leading economies. In 2011, a full third of Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) was comprised of exports and imports. In contrast, just 15 percent of U.S. GDP was derived from the same. Mexico's extensive network of FTAs includes most of the Western Hemisphere, Israel, and Japan. It also belongs to an economic partnership with the European Union (enacted in 2000) and to NAFTA—the world's largest FTA to date, with a combined GDP of $17 trillion linking 450 million people. Last year, Mexico joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, a high-standard FTA among a number of Pacific Rim countries that remains in the works. It is also a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), and the emerging Pacific Alliance, a free trade and integration effort that hopes to become the commercial bridge between the Americas and the Asia Pacific region**. Mexico alone is a bigger market for the United States than all the BRIC economies combined, and growing opportunities for trade and investment in the economy solidify this status moving forward**. Q2: Why has Mexico been excluded from TTIP negotiations to date? A2: **While Mexico's recent economic growth has proven impressive, entering the TTIP would provide a meaningful surge for the Mexican economy, potentially propelling it into the proverbial big leagues**. Mexico's interest in being included in the agreement is no secret, but both the United States and the European Union have ignored the petition, claiming inopportune political circumstances. The reasoning here is twofold. First, given the years of encouragement that preceded the formal start of EU-U.S. negotiations, neither party wishes to jeopardize what could be the biggest FTA in history by bringing more participants on board--regardless of the value their inclusion adds. Leaders from both the United States and the EU think this would bring a long and burdensome political process that could prove detrimental for the negotiations. And though both have shied away from anything that might complicate the process of reaching an initial agreement, neither has rejected the idea of accepting more members down the road, once the agreement is consolidated. The second argument is more of a corollary to the first. At his talk with the Americas Program last week, Christian Leffler, the EU’s managing director for the Americas, explained that because Mexico already shares FTAs with the United States and the EU, including Mexico in the TTIP can be seen as superfluous—at least for now. Particularly given the drag additional parties could put on negotiations, the benefits of including Mexico, so the argument goes, fail to outweigh the potential costs. Q3: Why should Mexico be included in the ongoing TTIP negotiations? A3: In simplest terms**, all three parties stand to gain from including Mexico in the TTIP negotiations. While Mexico does have standing trade agreements with the United States and the European Union, both are seen as outdated**. EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht called for the modernization of the current Mexico-EU agreement last November, and NAFTA modernization including the energy and telecommunications sectors, both of which were excluded when the agreement entered into force nearly 20 years ago, would greatly advance the political and economic interests of the United States. Mexico's stake in being included the agreement is straightforward. The sheer size of the proposed market, coupled with the added competitiveness Mexico would lose out on should it remain excluded, together provide a compelling rationale for why TTIP membership is in Mexico's interests. **It is important for the United States and the EU to remember that Mexico brings a lot to the negotiating table. First,** Europe, in dire need of economic reinvigoration and expanded employment, has much to gain from Mexico's liberalized trade with the rest of the world--and its need for foreign direct investment**. Second**, the U.S.-Mexican economic interdependence implies that indirectly, the more Mexico enhances its global trade relationships, the better off the United States is as well. **Finally,** because Mexican supply chains are already closely linked to the rest of Latin America and the Asia Pacific region, both the United States and the European Union stand to gain from increased access to those markets as well, and that access could come by means of Mexico's inclusion in the TTIP, given its membership in both the TPP and the Pacific Alliance. **Just as NAFTA transformed the relationship between the United States and Mexico, a TTIP that brought our southern neighbor on board could do the same for transatlantic relations.** Given its global commercial links, and growing economy and productivity, it makes more sense than ever to bring in one of our biggest economic partners to the TTIP. Conclusion: Mexico is reemerging as a leading destination for foreign investment given the country's low production costs, proximity to the U.S. market, recent sweeping reforms in key economic sectors (and more expected to come), and emerging economies of scale in high-skilled industries. Engaging in the dynamic free trade opportunities the TTIP offers will spur North American and transatlantic economic cooperation alike--and strengthen all parties' competitiveness globally.

#### Increased Latin American trade key to European economic recovery.

**Ferreira 8/1** – candidate for Masters of Public Administration at Cornell University, writing for WorldPolicy (Luis A., “The European Union’s Trade with Latin America”, 8/1/13; <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/08/01/european-unions-trade-latin-america)//Beddow

As the European Union searches for solutions to problems within its economic model, it is imperative that it finds ways to stimulate economic growth. Given that trade is one of the European Union’s foundational characteristics, it should look to expand trade as a means of promoting growth. Although Asia often grabs headlines due to its economic performance, and Brussels has begun negotiating a free trade agreement with the United States, **the European Union should put effort into expanding trade with Latin America**, a region that has seen significant economic growth in the last decade and has strong economic ties with Europe. In the last 10 years trade between the European Union and Latin America doubled to around $280 billion. The European Union has free trade agreements with the Central American and Caribbean countries, with the members of the Pacific Alliance -- Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Peru -- while similar talks are in progress with Mercosur, which comprises of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Additionally, a recent UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) report shows that Europe is essential for Latin America’s development, with European foreign direct investments (FDI’s) outmatching those from China, India, and Russia. Europe already trades extensively with Latin America. Last year, the European Union exported over $145 billion to Latin America, or 6.5 percent of its total exports, with more than $52.12 billion to Brazil and $36.76 billion to Mexico alone. Meanwhile, America Móvil, a Mexican telecommunications company, doubled its investment in Europe to $25,597 billion from 2011, with Austria and the Netherlands receiving $4.48 billion. Spain is equally involved in Latin America, with half of the profits in 2011 from Spanish banks coming from their Latin American branches, while in 2010 these subsidiaries sent $151 billion to Spain. These figures illustrate strong regional commerce. While this is a good foundation, European-Latin American commerce must be expanded further. The European Union can aid this process by finalizing its free trade agreement with Mercosur, while also reducing agricultural tariffs. The end of the 20 years banana dispute last November, in which the European Union agreed to reduce its tariff on bananas, was a good step forward. While securing the free trade agreement and altering European Common Agricultural Policy tariff will not be easily accomplished, the completion of both would significantly boost trade and **invigorate European growth**. Given their strong economic and social ties with Latin America, Spain and Portugal can lead the way. In early June, Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo reiterated Latin America’s importance to Spain during talks with EU High Commissioner, Catherine Ashton. Portugal has also benefited tremendously from Brazil, with President Dilma Rousseff pledging solidarity and calling for an expansion of trade between the two countries. Similarly, both Madrid and Lisbon have led European ties with Latin America through the Organization of Ibero-American States (founded in 1949) and its annual Ibero-American Summits (started in 1991). Finally, despite their disappointment, the EU-Latin America summits, which began in 1999, should continue so that leaders from both sides have a forum to expand relations on strengthening democracy, the rule of law, international peace and political stability. This past January’s EU-Latin America summit in Chile failed to deliver on European leaders’ hope of finalizing the free trade agreement with Mercosur, yet it delivered a declaration calling on legal safety for European investments. Although the European Union’s largest problems are institutional and the Union cannot rely on trade alone to pull itself out of recession, it has a great opportunity to begin its economic recovery by expanding commerce with Latin America. As Latin American economies continue to increase, the European Union should use that opportunity for its own growth.

#### European economic decline causes EU-breakup and Eurowar.

**Schwarz 11** – International Committee of the Fourth International (Peter, “The Unravelling of the European Union”, 11/14/11; <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/11/pers-n14.html>)//Beddow

Less than a year ago the demise of the euro and the breakup of the European Union were generally conceived of as unthinkable. Now, they are the dominant themes in European politics and in the media. German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently warned parliament, “If the euro fails, Europe fails.” Similar warnings have been made by French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Not only the notoriously euro-skeptical British press, but also such pro-European papers as France’s Le Monde and Germany’s Die Zeit are no longer excluding the failure of the common European currency. European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso has described the economic consequences of such a development in the starkest terms. **The collapse of the euro zone would cause an economic crash that would instantly wipe out half of the value of Europe's economy, plunging the continent into a depression** as deep as the 1930s slump, he has declared. But the alternative proposed by Merkel, Sarkozy and Barroso to avoid such a catastrophe is not less disastrous. It amounts to setting up a dictatorship of the financial markets over every aspect of social life. Recent events in Greece and Italy confirm this. In each country a government of experts selected by the EU is being formed without any democratic legitimacy. Its task is to decimate the living standards of the people by implementing unprecedented austerity measures. In fact, “saving” the euro by means of austerity measures and the breakup of Europe are not opposite, but rather parallel political strategies serving the same basic aim. The recent EU summit in Brussels set the course for both. It dictated punitive austerity measures for Greece and Italy and subordinated the Greek budget to the control of the “troika”—the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank. At the same time, it did not exclude the exit of Greece from the euro zone. Merkel’s chancellery has already prepared studies on the financial implications of such a step, and if one country leaves the euro zone, it will hardly be possible to avoid the exodus of others. Yet another fault line in the EU has been deepened by the Brussels summit. Its decision to coordinate the financial and economic policies of the 17 euro nations more closely and form some sort of economic government will marginalize the ten EU member states that remain outside the euro zone. The division of Europe into a core dominated by Germany and France and an impotent periphery is being prepared. London, in particular, has sharply protested against this step. The European Union is faced with an insoluble dilemma. **If the euro fails, the EU breaks up.** But if the euro is kept alive by a core Europe dominated by Germany or by Germany and France, that will also lead to the breakup of Europe. In both cases the **result will be the balkanization of Europe and a relapse into the type of national conflicts that produced two world wars in the last century.** Marxists anticipated the breakup of the European Union long ago. In the 1920s, Leon Trotsky, who considered the unification of Europe an urgent necessity, published several articles on the theme. He pointed out that it was impossible to unify Europe on a capitalist basis because capitalist property is inseparably bound up with the nation-state. The bourgeoisie, in conflict with the working class and in competition with its international rivals, needs the nation state to defend its class interests and cannot do without it. In an article published by Pravda in 1923, Trotsky wrote: “Europe cannot develop economically within the state and customs frontiers imposed at Versailles. Europe is compelled either to remove these frontiers or face the threat of complete economic decay. But the methods adopted by the ruling bourgeoisie to overcome the frontiers itself had created are only increasing the existing chaos and accelerating the disintegration.” In 1989, when the Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe were faltering and illusions about a prosperous capitalist Europe were being widely promoted, the International Committee of the Fourth International wrote in its European Election Manifesto: “The European single market does not mean the unity of Europe. Quite the opposite, it only creates the arena for the most powerful European conglomerates, which have already fought two world wars in this century, to renew their struggle for European domination. It goes along with a new wave of capital concentration and monopolization and raises existing political, economic and social contradictions to new heights.” Recent events have fully confirmed this analysis. The advances made in the economic integration of Europe during the second half of the Twentieth Century were the result of extraordinary historic circumstances—the suppression of the class struggle by Stalinism and Social Democracy and the immense economic power of the United States, which provided the basis for the revival of the war-ravaged European economy with the Marshall Plan and the establishment of the dollar as the world reserve currency. The common front against the Soviet Union in the Cold War also helped to weld the Western European powers together. But even the most economically powerful nation-state could not provide a lasting and viable framework for the progressive development of the world economy. The attempt of the United States to reconstruct world capitalism under its tutelage and domination only created the conditions for the rise of powerful rivals in Europe and Asia and its own decline. The conflicting national interests were never overcome, however. Rather, the process of European integration proceeded generally in accordance with the national interests of all those involved: Germany got easier access to export markets; France obtained a means to control its traditional German foe; Britain gained access to the European market after the demise of its empire while retaining the special role of the City of London. Now, the **economic decline of the US and the international financial crisis are reviving the national antagonisms in Europe.**

#### European war goes nuclear – draws in US.

**Glaser 93** – Professor of Public Policy at University of Chicago [Charles L., International Security , Summer, p. 8-9]

However, although the lack of an imminent Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger, U.S. security has not been entirely separated from the future of Western Europe. The ending of the Cold War has brought many benefits, but has not eliminated the possibility of major power war, especially since such a war could grow out of a smaller conflict in the East. And, although nuclear weapons have greatly reduced the threat that a European hegemon would pose to U.S . security, a sound case nevertheless remains that **a European war could threaten U.S. security. The United States could be drawn into such a war , even if strict security considerations suggested it should stay out. A major power war could escalate to a nuclear war** that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American homeland. Thus, the United States should not be unconcerned about Europe’s future.

#### Extinction.

**MIT 09** –Political Science Department, well-sourced study theorizing hypothetical WWII with nuclear weapons (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Causes and Prevention of War: Nuclear War in Europe: A Thought Experiment”, Spring 2009; < http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/political-science/17-42-causes-and-prevention-of-war-spring-2009/assignments/MIT17\_42S09\_student8assign2.pdf>)//Beddow

In addition to providing information on nuclear strategies, studies of the Cold War gives historians accurate estimates of the damage a nuclear war would have caused. Most Cold War estimates indicate that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would have destroyed 50-80% of both countries 12 . By applying these numbers to Europe in the early 1940's it is possible to estimate the total number of lives which would have been lost in a nuclear war. In the best possible case, only France and Germany would have used their nuclear arsenals obliterating each other, but causing little damage to the rest of Europe. At the time, the population of France was approximately 40 million people, and Germany (including Austria) reported a population just shy of 80 million people in 1938 13 . Combining these numbers with Cold War estimates, the best possible scenario ends with 60-92 million people dead. However, Britain probably would have joined France in a nuclear war, meaning the British population would also have been affected. Given that the population of Britain was about 50 million people before the war 14 , total deaths would have numbered about 85-117 million distributed between France, Britain, and German in proportion to their prewar populations. This is slightly higher than the 72 million actually killed in WWII and would have occurred much more quickly. This loss of human life would have been accompanied by decreased European productivity. After World War II, the combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Britain, France, and German was about 750 billion dollars per year, a slight increase from the prewar years 15 However, after a nuclear war, production would have been effectively eliminated. Crops would have failed due to clouds of radioactive particles saturating the atmosphere, and almost all industry would have been targeted destroyed in the nuclear attack 16 . Hence ,the GDP of Europe after a nuclear war would have been many orders of magnitude lower than the actual GDP observed after World War II. This destruction of productivity, a net decrease of about 750 billion dollars per year, twenty-five percent of world production. These figures are substantially higher than those actually observed and the destruction would have occurred in a shorter amount of time--an axiomatically more intense war. These estimates of intensity ignore externalities (effects on countries not directly involved in the conflict) which would have significantly affected the intensity of the war. Specifically, **environmental and genetic damage would have had global consequences**. There has never been a large scale nuclear war, so it is difficult to predict the environmental response; however during the Cold War, certain "doomsday" theories were postulated. The theory of nuclear winter speculates that a large scale nuclear war could potentially destroy humanity by clouding the skies with radioactive dust 17 . Although the extent to which this would have occurred is debated, it is likely that any large scale nuclear war would result in a significant number of deaths due to environmental damage 18 . A second externality presented by a nuclear war is the dispersal of radioactive material. The radiation from this material would have increased genetic mutations worldwide leading to reduced life expectancies and a general degradation in quality of life. These factors would have significantly increased the intensity of a European nuclear war.

#### EU leadership mitigates the worst impacts of warming.

**EU 7/1/13** – (European Union, “What is the EU doing about climate change?”, 7/1/13; < http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/index\_en.htm>)//Beddow

Preventing dangerous climate change is a strategic priority for the European Union. Europe is working hard to cut its greenhouse gas emissions substantially while encouraging other nations and regions to do likewise. In parallel, the European Commission and some Member States are developing adaptation strategies to help strengthen Europe's resilience to the inevitable impacts of climate change. Reining in climate change carries a cost, but doing nothing would be far more expensive in the long run. Moreover, investing in the green technologies that cut emissions will also boost the economy, create jobs and strengthen Europe's competitiveness. Preventing dangerous climate change **To prevent the most severe impacts of climate change, the international community has agreed that global warming should be kept below 2ºC** compared to the temperature in pre-industrial times. That means a temperature increase of no more than 1.2°C above today's level. To stay within this ceiling, the scientific evidence shows that the world must stop the growth in global greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 at the latest, reduce them by at least half of 1990 levels by the middle of this century and continue cutting them thereafter. Targets up to 2050 EU leaders have committed to transforming Europe into a highly energy-efficient, low carbon economy. The EU has set itself targets for reducing its greenhouse gas emissions progressively up to 2050 and is working successfully towards meeting them. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the 15 countries that were EU members before 2004 ('EU-15') are committed to reducing their collective emissions to 8% below 1990 levels by the years 2008-2012. Emissions monitoring and projections show that the EU-15 is well on track to meet this target. Most Member States that have joined the EU since 2004 also have Kyoto reduction targets of 6% or 8% (5% in Croatia's case) which they are on course to achieve. For 2020, the EU has committed to cutting its emissions to 20% below 1990 levels. This commitment is one of the headline targets of the Europe 2020 growth strategy and is being implemented through a package of binding legislation. The EU has offered to increase its emissions reduction to 30% by 2020 if other major emitting countries in the developed and developing worlds commit to undertake their fair share of a global emissions reduction effort. For 2050, EU leaders have endorsed the objective of reducing Europe's greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% compared to 1990 levels as part of efforts by developed countries as a group to reduce their emissions by a similar degree. The European Commission has published a roadmap for building the low-carbon European economy that this will require. Taking the initiative EU initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions include: The European Climate Change Programme (ECCP), which has led to the implementation of dozens of new policies and measures; The EU Emissions Trading System, which has become the EU's key tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from industry most cost-effectively; Adopting legislation to raise the share of energy consumption produced by renewable energy sources, such as wind, solar and biomass, to 20% by 2020; Setting a target to increase Europe's energy efficiency by 20% by 2020 by improving the energy efficiency of buildings and of a wide array of equipment and household appliances; Binding targets to reduce CO2 emissions from new cars and vans; Supporting the development of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies to trap and store CO2 emitted by power stations and other major industrial installations. Mainstreaming climate into other policies The fight against climate change concerns is increasingly being reflected in other policy areas. To further advance this "mainstreaming" process, the European Commission has proposed that at least 20% of the EU's budget for 2014-2020 should be spent on climate-relevant measures. **The EU at the forefront of international efforts The EU has long been a driving force in international negotiations on climate change and was instrumental in the development of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol.** Thanks to pressure from the EU and other progressive countries, UN negotiations are under way to draw up a new global climate agreement covering all countries and to achieve greater cuts in global emissions over the rest of this decade. The aim is to keep global warming below 2°C compared to the temperature that prevailed in pre-industrial times. The new framework is to be finalised by 2015 and implemented from 2020. The EU is pressing for an agreement that is ambitious, comprehensive and legally binding. As part of the transition to the future global climate regime the EU is taking part in a second phase of the Kyoto Protocol running from 2013 to 2020. As the world's leading donor of development aid, the EU also provides substantial funding to help developing countries tackle climate change, including just over €7.3 billion in "fast start" financing over 2010-2012.

#### Sscientific consensus is that warming is real and anthropogenic – newest IPCC draft proves

**Gillis 8/19/13** environmental reporter for the New York Times (Justin Gillis, 19 August 2013, “Climate Panel Cites Near Certainty on Warming,” The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/science/earth/extremely-likely-that-human-activity-is-driving-climate-change-panel-finds.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=1&)//KP

An international panel of scientists has found with near certainty that human activity is the cause of most of the temperature increases of recent decades, and warns that sea levels could conceivably rise by more than three feet by the end of the century if emissions continue at a runaway pace. The scientists, whose findings are reported in a draft summary of the next big United Nations climate report, largely dismiss a recent slowdown in the pace of warming, which is often cited by climate change doubters, attributing it most likely to short-term factors. The report emphasizes that the basic facts about future climate change are more established than ever, justifying the rise in global concern. It also reiterates that the consequences of escalating emissions are likely to be profound. “It is extremely likely that human influence on climate caused more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010,” the draft report says. “There is high confidence that this has warmed the ocean, melted snow and ice, raised global mean sea level and changed some climate extremes in the second half of the 20th century.” The draft comes from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a body of several hundred scientists that won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007, along with Al Gore. Its summaries, published every five or six years, are considered the definitive assessment of the risks of climate change, and they influence the actions of governments around the world. Hundreds of billions of dollars are being spent on efforts to reduce greenhouse emissions, for instance, largely on the basis of the group’s findings. The coming report will be the fifth major assessment from the group, created in 1988. Each report has found greater certainty that the planet is warming and greater likelihood that humans are the primary cause. The 2007 report found “unequivocal” evidence of warming, but hedged a little on responsibility, saying the chances were at least 90 percent that human activities were the cause. The language in the new draft is stronger, saying the odds are at least 95 percent that humans are the principal cause. On sea level, which is one of the biggest single worries about climate change, the new report goes well beyond the assessment published in 2007, which largely sidestepped the question of how much the ocean could rise this century. The new report also reiterates a core difficulty that has plagued climate science for decades: While averages for such measures as temperature can be predicted with some confidence on a global scale, the coming changes still cannot be forecast reliably on a local scale. That leaves governments and businesses fumbling in the dark as they try to plan ahead. On another closely watched issue, the scientists retreated slightly from their 2007 position. Regarding the question of how much the planet could warm if carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere doubled, the previous report largely ruled out any number below 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit. The new draft says the rise could be as low as 2.7 degrees, essentially restoring a scientific consensus that prevailed from 1979 to 2007. But the draft says only that the low number is possible, not that it is likely. Many climate scientists see only a remote chance that the warming will be that low, with the published evidence suggesting that an increase above 5 degrees Fahrenheit is more likely if carbon dioxide doubles. The level of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas, is up 41 percent since the Industrial Revolution, and if present trends continue it could double in a matter of decades. Warming the entire planet by 5 degrees Fahrenheit would add a stupendous amount of energy to the climate system. Scientists say the increase would be greater over land and might exceed 10 degrees at the poles. They add that such an increase would lead to widespread melting of land ice, extreme heat waves, difficulty growing food and massive changes in plant and animal life, probably including a wave of extinctions. The new document is not final and will not become so until an intensive, closed-door negotiating session among scientists and government leaders in Stockholm in late September. But if the past is any guide, most of the core findings of the document will survive that final review. The document was leaked over the weekend after it was sent to a large group of people who had signed up to review it. It was first reported on in detail by the Reuters news agency, and The New York Times obtained a copy independently to verify its contents. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change does no original research, but instead periodically assesses and summarizes the published scientific literature on climate change. The draft document “is likely to change in response to comments from governments received in recent weeks and will also be considered by governments and scientists at a four-day approval session at the end of September,” the panel’s spokesman, Jonathan Lynn, said in a statement Monday. “It is therefore premature and could be misleading to attempt to draw conclusions from it.” After winning the Nobel Peace Prize six years ago, the group became a political target for climate doubters, who helped identify minor errors in the 2007 report. This time, the panel adopted rigorous procedures in the hope of preventing such mistakes. Some climate doubters challenge the idea that the earth is warming at all; others concede that it is, but deny human responsibility; still others acknowledge a human role, but assert that the warming is likely to be limited and the impacts manageable. Every major scientific academy in the world has warned that global warming is a serious problem. The panel shifted to a wider range for the potential warming, dropping the plausible low end to 2.7 degrees, after a wave of recent studies saying higher estimates were unlikely. But those studies are contested, and scientists at Stockholm are likely to debate whether to stick with that language. Michael E. Mann, a climate scientist at Pennsylvania State University, said he feared the intergovernmental panel, in writing its draft, had been influenced by criticism from climate doubters, who advocate even lower numbers. “I think the I.P.C.C. on this point has once again erred on the side of understating the degree of the likely changes,” Dr. Mann said. However, Christopher B. Field, a researcher at the Carnegie Institution for Science who serves on the panel but was not directly involved in the new draft, said the group had to reflect the full range of plausible scientific views. “I think that the I.P.C.C. has a tradition of being very conservative,” Dr. Field said. “They really want the story to be right.” Regarding the likely rise in sea level over the coming century, the new report lays out several possibilities. In the most optimistic, the world’s governments would prove far more successful at getting emissions under control than they have been in the recent past, helping to limit the total warming. In that circumstance, sea level could be expected to rise as little as 10 inches by the end of the century, the report found. That is a bit more than the eight-inch increase in the 20th century, which proved manageable even though it caused severe erosion along the world’s shorelines. At the other extreme, the report considers a chain of events in which emissions continue to increase at a swift pace. Under those conditions, sea level could be expected to rise at least 21 inches by 2100 and might increase a bit more than three feet, the draft report said. Hundreds of millions of people live near sea level, and either figure would represent a challenge for humanity, scientists say. But a three-foot rise in particular would endanger many of the world’s great cities — among them New York; London; Shanghai; Venice; Sydney, Australia; Miami; and New Orleans.

#### Best methodology proves warming causes extinction in a few decades – positive feedbacks and tipping points.

**Guterl 12** – Executive Editor of Scientific American, expert in Climate and Environment, Science Policy, citing James Hanson, a NASA scientist (Fred, “Climate Armageddon: How the World’s Weather Could Quickly Run Amok”, 5/25/12; < http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-worlds-weather-could-quickly-run-amok>)//Beddow

The world has warmed since those heady days of Gaia, and scientists have grown gloomier in their assessment of the state of the world's climate. NASA climate scientist James Hanson has warned of a "Venus effect," in which **runaway warming turns Earth into an uninhabitable desert**, with a surface temperature high enough to melt lead, sometime in the next few centuries. Even Hanson, though, is beginning to look downright optimistic compared to a new crop of climate scientists, who fret that things could head south as quickly as **a handful of years**, or even months, if we're particularly unlucky. Ironically, some of them are intellectual offspring of Lovelock, the original optimist gone sour. The true gloomsters are scientists who look at climate through the lens of "dynamical systems," a mathematics that describes things that tend to change suddenly and are difficult to predict. It is the mathematics of the tipping point—the moment at which a "system" that has been changing slowly and predictably will suddenly "flip." The colloquial example is the straw that breaks that camel's back. Or you can also think of it as a ship that is stable until it tips too far in one direction and then capsizes. In this view, **Earth's climate is, or could soon be, ready to capsize, causing sudden, perhaps catastrophic, changes**. And once it capsizes, it could be next to impossible to right it again. The idea that climate behaves like a dynamical system addresses some of the key shortcomings of the conventional view of climate change—the view that looks at the planet as a whole, in terms of averages. A dynamical systems approach, by contrast, consider climate as a sum of many different parts, each with its own properties, all of them interdependent in ways that are hard to predict. One of the most productive scientists in applying dynamical systems theory to climate is Tim Lenton at the University of East Anglia in England. Lenton is a Lovelockian two generations removed— his mentors were mentored by Lovelock. "We are looking quite hard at past data and observational data that can tell us something," says Lenton. "Classical case studies in which you've seen abrupt changes in climate data. For example, in the Greenland ice-core records, you're seeing climate jump. And the end of the Younger Dryas," about fifteen thousand years ago, "you get a striking climate change." So far, he says, nobody has found a big reason for such an abrupt change in these past events—no meteorite or volcano or other event that is an obvious cause—which suggests that perhaps something about the way these climate shifts occur simply makes them sudden. Lenton is mainly interested in the future. He has tried to look for things that could possibly change suddenly and drastically even though nothing obvious may trigger them. He's come up with a short list of nine tipping points—nine weather systems, regional in scope, that could make a rapid transition from one state to another.

#### The plan is key to U.S. growth and recovery

Noriega and Cardenas 12 – \*Former US State Dept Official, \*\* director with Vision Americas (“An action plan for US policy in the Americas,” December, http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/an-action-plan-for-us-policy-in-the-americas/)//BB

Key points in this Outlook: America’s economic crisis and threats to US security have undermined its traditional global-leadership role and weakened its connections to Latin American nations that continue to modernize their economies.¶ The United States must recover its regional credibility by taking bold initiatives to restore its fiscal solvency, while aggressively promoting trade, energy interdependence, technology transfer, and economic growth. ¶ The United States must then retool its strategy for its partners in the Americas by working with them to combat threats such as cross-border criminality and radical populism, encouraging dialogue with regional leaders, and ensuring law enforcement cooperation to develop a mutually beneficial relationship. ¶ ¶ A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success and security. The region is home to three of the top four foreign sources of energy to the United States, as well as the fastest-growing destinations for US exports and investment. Clearly, geography and shared values predetermine a united destiny for the United States and its neighbors in the Americas. How positive and fruitful that destiny will be depends on whether US policymakers, private businesses, and civil society move with a greater sense of purpose toward seizing promising opportunities and meeting critical challenges.¶ Times have changed. The US fiscal crisis and preoccupation with two distant wars have distracted policymakers in Washington and undermined US leadership in the Americas. Although access to the US market, investment, technology, and other economic benefits are highly valued by most countries in the Western Hemisphere, today, the United States is no longer the only major partner to choose from. Asia (principally China) and Europe are making important inroads. So, as US policymakers retool their strategy for the Americas, they must shelve the paternalism of the past and be much more energetic in forming meaningful partnerships with willing neighbors.¶ Of course, the United States must recover its credibility by making bold decisions to restore its own fiscal solvency, while aggressively promoting trade, energy interdependence, technology transfer, and economic growth. Then, Washington will be better positioned to cultivate greater economic and political cooperation among its neighbors, beginning with an open and candid dialogue with the region’s leaders about their vision, their challenges, and their priorities. Partnerships can thus be built on common ground.¶ The security challenges in the Americas are very real and growing more complicated every day. Illegal narcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime, and radical populism fueled by petrodollars and allied with dangerous extraregional forces pose daunting challenges. Although it is wise to prioritize a positive socioeconomic and political agenda, assessing and addressing threats is an indispensable prerequisite to achieving US security and regional leadership.¶ To make the most of their united destiny, the United States and its partners in the Americas should:¶ Promote and defend democracy, the rule of law, and human rights and private property as the building blocks of just societies, accountable governments, and prosperous economies;¶ Advocate and support the empowerment of individuals through the development of strong free-market economies, healthy private sectors, and free trade among nations;¶ Assist neighbors in addressing their essential security needs so they can grow in peace and be more effective allies to prevent or confront common threats;¶ Incentivize capital markets and encourage new and innovative technology cooperation to develop a regional community that is interdependent in the production and distribution of a range of products and services—particularly energy;¶ Confront international organized crime in Mexico and Central America by supporting effective law-enforcement institutions and competent judicial systems;¶ Work with willing allies to restore the Organization of American States to its essential mission of promoting and defending common values and meeting common threats;¶ Address the role of China and Russia in the Americas by encouraging open and transparent regional investment and trade and rejecting exploitive policies that undermine local societies, regional security, and economic growth;¶ Combat threats posed by authoritarian regimes and their ties with Iran, Hezbollah, and transnational criminal organizations; ¶ Assist the Cuban people in transitioning to a post–Castro Cuba by helping to jump-start their private sector, rehabilitate their economy, and restore their political freedoms when the dictatorship collapses.¶ ¶ Maximizing Mutual Global Competitiveness¶ Expanding regional economic cooperation is crucial to US economic growth. An aggressive trade promotion and investment strategy in today’s hypercompetitive, globalized economy is not a policy option; it is an imperative. Clearly, prosperity at home depends on success abroad. The economic opportunities in the Western Hemisphere are enormous, and US policy-makers and the private sector must recognize them as critical to US economic growth.¶ In 2011, US exports reached a record $2.1 trillion in total value, despite the fact that only 1 percent of US businesses export their products to foreign markets. The United States must expand on these opportunities. Exports benefit the US economy by offering companies opportunities to tap new markets, expand their production, and earn more consumer dollars. Today, 95 percent of the world’s consumers live outside the United States, and the International Monetary Fund predicts that, through 2015, some 80 percent of economic growth will take place beyond US shores.¶ It is indisputable that an aggressive US trade policy—meaning selling US goods and services in as many markets as possible—is essential for the US economy to hone its competitive edge in the 21st century. In this sense, America’s future is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbors in its own hemisphere. A prosperous hemisphere means a more prosperous United States.

#### Absent increased growth, US retrenchment and resultant wars are inevitable by the end of the decade.

**Lieberthal and O’Hanlon 12** – foreign policy scholars at the Brookings Institution (Kenneth and Michael, “The Real National Security Threat: America’s Debt”, 7/3/12; < http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/03/opinion/la-oe-ohanlon-fiscal-reform-20120703>)//Beddow

Economic renewal and fiscal reform have become the preeminent issues, not only for domestic and economic policy but for foreign policy as well. As the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm.Michael G. Mullen, was fond of saying, national debt has become perhaps our top national security threat. And neither major presidential candidate is doing enough about it. **This issue needs to be framed as crucial not just for our future prosperity but for international stability as well**. The United States has been running trillion-dollar deficits, resulting in a huge explosion in the country's indebtedness. Publicly held debt now equals 70% of gross domestic product, a threshold many economists consider significant and highly worrisome. Making matters worse, half of our current deficit financing is being provided by foreigners. We are getting by with low interest rates and tolerable levels of domestic investment only because they find U.S. debt attractive, which may not last. According to the nonpartisan Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, President Obama's long-term budget plan would allow publicly held debt as a fraction of GDP to rise further, up to 75%, within a decade. Mitt Romney's proposal, featuring tax cuts and defense spending increases and as-yet-unspecified (and thus less than fully credible) entitlement reform, appears worse. It would probably drive publicly held debt to 95% of GDP over the same period. Put differently, though both are serious and pragmatic men, neither major party's presidential candidate is adequately stepping up to the plate, with Romney's plan the more troubling of the two. Why is this situation so serious? First, we are headed for a level of debt that within a decade could require us to spend the first trillion dollars of every year's federal budget servicing that debt. Much less money will be left for other things. That is a prescription for a vicious cycle of underfinancing for our infrastructure, national education efforts, science research and all the other functions of government that are crucial to long-term economic growth**.** Robust defense spending will be unsustainable too**.** Once we get in this rut, getting out will be very hard. Second, **such a chronic economic decline would undercut what has been 70 years of strong national political consensus in favor of an activist and engaged American foreign policy**. One reason the United States was so engaged through the Cold War and the first 20 years of the post-Cold War world was fear of threats. But the other reason was that the strategy was associated with improvements in our quality of life as well. America became even more prosperous, and all major segments of society benefited. Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly, **American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad**. **Other countries sense our weakness** and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely**.** When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

#### Heg sustainable but declining – it must be renewed to stop war.

**Brzezinski 12** – former National Security Adviser (Zbigniew, “Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power”, 2012; <http://books.google.com/books?id=rx6KUegdcvoC>)//Beddow

In answering these questions this book will argue that America’s role in the world will continue to be essential in the years to come. Indeed, the ongoing changes in the distribution of global power and mounting global strife make it all the more imperative that America not retreat into an ignorant garrison-state mentality or wallow in self-righteous cultural hedonism. Such an America could cause the geopolitical prospects of the evolving world – in which the center of gravity is shifting from West to East – to become increasingly grave. **The world needs an America that is economically vital, socially appealing, responsibly powerful, strategically deliberate, internationally respected, and historically enlightened in its global engagement with the new East**. How likely is such a globally purposeful America? Today, America’s historical mood is uneasy, and **notions of America’s decline as historically inevitable are intellectually fashionable. However, this kind of periodic pessimism is neither novel nor self-fulfilling.** Even the belief that the twentieth century was “America’s century,” which became widespread in the wake of World War II, did not preclude the phases of anxiety regarding America’s long-range future. When the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, its first orbital satellite, during the Eisenhower administration, Americans became concerned about their prospects in both peaceful competition and strategic warfare. And again, when the United States failed to achieve a meaningful victory in Vietnam during the Nixon years, Soviet leaders confidently predicted America’s demise while historically pessimistic American policy makers sought détente in exchange for the status quo in the divided Europe. **But America proved to be more resilient** and the Soviet system eventually imploded. By 1991, following the disintegration both of the Soviet bloc and then the Soviet Union itself, the United States was left standing as the only global superpower. Not only the twentieth but even the twenty-first century then seemed destined to be American centuries. Both President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush confidently asserted as much. And academic circles echoed them with bold prognoses that the end of the Cold War meant in effect “the end of history” insofar as doctrinal debates regarding the relative superiority of competing social systems was concerned. The victory of liberal democracy was proclaimed not only as decisive but also final. Given that liberal democracy had flowered first in the West, the implied assumption was that henceforth the West would be the defining standard for the world. However, such super-optimism did not last long. The culture of self-gratification and deregulation that began during the Clinton years and continued under President George W. Bush led to the bursting of one stock market bubble at the turn of the century and a full-scale financial crash less than a decade later. The costly unilateralism of the younger Bush presidency led to a decade of war in the Middle East and the derailment of American foreign policy at large. The financial catastrophe of 2008 nearly precipitated a calamitous economic depression, jolting America and much of the West into a sudden recognition of their systemic vulnerability to unregulated greed. Moreover, in China and other Asian states a perplexing amalgam of economic liberalism and state capitalism demonstrated the surprising capacity for economic growth and technological innovation. This in turn prompted new anxiety about the future of America’s status as the leading world power. Indeed, there are several alarming similarities between the Soviet Union in the years just prior to its fall and the America of the early twenty-first century. The Soviet Union, with an increasingly gridlocked governmental system incapable of enacting serious policy revisions, in effect bankrupted itself by committing an inordinate percentage of its GNP to a decades-long military rivalry with the United States and exacerbated this problem by not taking on the additional costs of a decade-long attempt to conquer Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, it could not afford to sustain its competition with America in cutting-edge technological sectors and thus fell further behind: its economy stumbled and the society’s quality of life further deteriorated in comparison to the West: its ruling Communist class became cynically insensitive to widening social disparities while hypocritically masking its own privileged life-style; and finally, in foreign affairs it became increasingly self-isolated, while precipitating a geopolitically damaging hostility with its once-prime Eurasian ally, Communist China. These parallels, even if overdrawn, fortify the case that America must renew itself and pursue a comprehensive and long-term geopolitical vision, one that is responsive to the challenges of the changing historical context. Only a dynamic and strategically minded **America, together with a unifying Europe, can jointly promote a larger and more vital West, one capable of acting as a responsible partner to the rising and increasingly assertive East**. Otherwise, a geopolitically divided and self-centered West could slide into a historical decline reminiscent of the humiliating impotence of the nineteenth-century China, while **the East might be tempted to replicate the self-destructive power rivalries of twentieth-century Europe**. In brief, the crisis of global power is the cumulative consequence of the dynamic shift in the world’s center of gravity from the West to the East, of the accelerating surfacing of the restless phenomenon of global political awakening, and of America’s deficient domestic and international performance since its emergence by 1990 as the world’s only superpower. The foregoing **poses serious long-term risks to the survival of some endangered states, to the security of the global commons, and to global stability at large**. This book seeks to outline the needed strategic vision, looking beyond 2025.

## The Rest

#### Contention 2: WTO

#### Mexican TTIP inclusion is key to WTO credibility.

**Mildner and Schmucker 6/18/13** senior researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs – head of the Globalization and World Economy Program at German Council on Foreign Relations (Dr. Stormy-Annika Mildner, Dr. Claudia Schmucker, 18 June 2013, “Trade Agreement with Side-Effects?” http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2013C18\_mdn\_schmucker.pdf)//SL

However, a TTIP is not without risks for global trade and the multilateral trade system. Discrimination against third countries is a central problem of preferential agreements. Selective tariff abolition can eliminate protectionism and distortions between the signatories of such an agreement and create trade-generating and growth-boosting effects. As the economist Jacob Viner demonstrated in the 1950s, the bilateral/plurilateral abolition of trade barriers can increases trade if domestically produced goods and services or imports from third countries are substituted by cheaper (i.e. more efficiently produced) goods and services from the partner country. But frequently such an agreement leads to discrimination against third countries with trade-diverting effects. According to Viner, trade diversion occurs when the dismantling of trade barriers gives goods and services from the partner country a competitive advantage and consequently trade with third countries is diverted to the partner country even if the third country can produce the relevant goods and services more efficiently. One particular problem of preferential trade agreements is that they contain many different and contradictory rules. This applies above all to the rules of origin in free trade agreements (FTAs), which define which goods are granted preferential treatment. To enjoy preferential market access a particular proportion of the product must be produced in one of the FTA signatory countries. This is intended to prevent nonsignatories from profiting from preferential treatment without themselves making concessions. Cumulatively, the multiplicity of preferential trade agreements has produced a confusion of different rules of origin that tangibly obstruct trade. Small and mediumsized enterprises in particular suffer from high transaction costs. Worries that a TTIP would exacerbate the “spaghetti bowl effect” identified by economist Jagdish Bhagwati in the 1990s are certainly justified. A study by the German ifo-Institut published in January 2013 argues that countries geographically close to the United States or the European Union, countries with a high volume of trade with either or both of them, and countries with free trade agreements with either or both must expect to lose trade through a TTIP. For the United States this means in the first place Canada and Mexico, primarily through erosion of the preferential access to the US market both enjoy through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but also through trade-diverting effects. Australia, which has a FTA with the United States, is also a loser in both liberalisation scenarios (comprehensive agreement or tariff elimination). Another problem is that the TTIP talks could tie up a considerable proportion of EU and US negotiating capacity. Both sides are already involved in numerous bilateral and plurilateral negotiations. The European Union is currently negotiating FTAs with Canada, Japan and Mercosur, the United States, as already mentioned, with the TPP countries. Additional Transatlantic talks thus threaten to overstretch both executives and could further diminish interest in a successful conclusion of the Doha Round. Should the European Union and United States fail to conclude the bilateral talks within a reasonable timeframe they also risk damage to their reputations as capable political actors and their credibility as proponents of open markets. But speedy conclusion will be no easy matter with so many sensitive topics involved. Many European states reject liberalisation of agricultural trade, and France has recently succeeded in excluding cultural services from the talks. Finally, a TTIP could also have unintended political repercussions. Emerging economies and developing countries could interpret it as an instrument of exclusion or even an attempt to blackmail them into making concessions in the Doha Round. In the worst case this threatens to block the already difficult WTO talks. While such scenarios are certainly plausible, the Transatlantic partners have options for counteracting them. Ensure WTO Compatibility Their economic and political weight lends the European Union and United States a special responsibility for the world trade order. Thus, how must the TTIP be designed if it is to benefit rather than harm the multilateral trading system? In the first place it must be compatible with WTO rules and serve as a stepping stone for future global liberalisation regimes. Firstly, the Transatlantic Partnership should liberalise trade and address trade plus issues. Secondly, it should standardise rules in order to simplify the “spaghetti bowl” of competing and contradictory rules. Thirdly, it should be open for new members to avoid exclusion. And fourthly, it should recognise the WTO as the central arbitration instance and avoid undermining its dispute settlement procedure. Comprehensive Liberalisation Preferential trade agreements contradict the central WTO principle of most-favoured nation treatment (MFN), because they grant partners benefits that are denied to others. Accordingly, they are permitted only as an intermediate step in the multilateral liberalisation process and subject to rules laid out in GATT Article XXIV (for trade in goods) and GATS Article V (for trade in services). Paragraphs 4 to 10 of the GATT Article define the conditions under which customs unions and free trade zones may be created. These involve definition of such entities, duty of notification, treatment of third countries, etc. Paragraphs 8 (a) (i) (customs unions) and 8 (b) (free trade agreements), under which the tariffs for “substantially all the trade” must be dismantled, are especially important. Under paragraph 5 (b), the external duties of countries participating in a free trade zone must not be higher than before conclusion of the agreement. Given that these conditions would also apply to the TTIP, it would be impossible to exclude whole sectors from liberalisation. Removing agriculture from the TTIP talks, as proposed by Renate Künast, leader of the Green Party parliamentary group in the German Bundestag, would thus contradict WTO rules. GATS Article V defines the conditions for economic integration in the service sector a little more loosely. The Partnership would only need to have “substantial sectoral coverage” rather than covering all sectors. Agreements must also provide for “the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination … between or among the parties”. Exceptions are thus permitted, and GATS also provides exemptions for cultural services, but the goal should be for a TTIP to cover at least all services that are in line for liberalisation through the WTO. But the ambitions of the TTIP should not end with the scope and depth of WTO regulation. Instead it would be desirable for the talks to reach beyond the traditional realm of the WTO and address the aforementioned trade plus issues. New cross-cutting issues like treatment of state-run companies and stronger integration of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) should also be included. With these issues of broader interest a first step could be taken towards global regulation. Harmonised Rules As already mentioned, one drawback of the numerous existing preferential agreements is that they create an increasingly complex tangle of rules that tend to hamper rather than ease free trade. Special attention must be given to rules of origin. The European Union and the United States should ensure that any new rules of origin do not worsen the global regulatory chaos and are compatible with the pre-existing FTAs of both sides. The rules should also be as generous as possible in order to prevent the danger of trade diversion and the associated discrimination against third states. At the same time it would make sense to extend market access and new rules for investment or procurement to other trade partners that are willing in return to liberalise their markets to the same extent. Openness to New Members If a preferential agreement is not to harm the multilateral trading order it must be open to third countries. The TTIP is no exception. Initially it will be negotiated solely between the European Union and the United States. But in the long term it would be desirable to expand it to the whole NAFTA region, especially given that the European Union already has a free trade agreement with Mexico and is currently negotiating one with Canada. The more members a preferential agreement comprises, the smaller the trade-diverting effects and the greater the chances of multilateralisation.

#### That generates a perception of non-discriminatory trade regime – key to successful Doha accords.

Hills 4/24/13 Chief Executive Officer of Hills & Company International Consultants, former U.S. Trade Representative, and key negotiator of NAFTA (Carla A. Hills, 24 April 2013, “A Trans-Atlantic Trade Pact for the World” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/opinion/global/a-trans-atlantic-trade-pact-for-the-world.html?\_r=4&)//SL

The security dimension was real, because in addition to the projected economic benefits, past experience showed that as governments liberalized their trade regimes, they generally liberalized their political regimes. Adherence to an agreed set of trade rules and support for the W.T.O. dispute settlement mechanism encourages nondiscrimination, transparency and rule of law, which contribute to increased stability. The Doha negotiations broke down in 2005 and have made little progress since. Trade commentators are declaring Doha dead and multilateral negotiations obsolete as governments increasingly have turned to negotiating bilateral and regional trade agreements that create conflicting rules and distort trade by creating trade preferences for the signatories at the expense of those that do not participate. There is legitimate concern that the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements could render the W.T.O. irrelevant and destroy the enormous benefits we derive from our multilateral trading system. What could bring the 159 W.T.O. members back to the table? Ironically, history demonstrates that the successful negotiation of a major regional trade agreement of high quality can provide the necessary catalyst. In 1990, the Uruguay Round collapsed in Brussels. In June 1991 the United States, Mexico and Canada launched the negotiations of a North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta). Fourteen months later negotiations were concluded. President George H.W. Bush signed the agreement in December 1992; President Clinton secured congressional approval of the agreement the following year. By joining the economies of Canada, Mexico and the U.S., Nafta created a regional market of over 400 million people. It was the first comprehensive free trade agreement to join developed and developing nations, and it achieved broader and deeper trade liberalization than any prior trade agreement. The world’s reaction was broad, deep and fast. In just a few months following the passage of the Nafta, trade negotiators returned to the bargaining table, completed the Uruguay Round, and created the W.T.O. to the enormous benefit of the global economy. If we are to repeat the success of two decades ago, we will require an even greater catalyst: a regional trade agreement of such quality and scope that the rest of the world is galvanized. The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership recently announced by the European Union and the United States could be that catalyst. That negotiation would involve roughly half the global economy. The negotiation need not be protracted. The E.U. and the U.S. each recently concluded free trade agreements with South Korea that could serve as a template upon which to build. The proposed Trans-Atlantic Partnership could have even more heft if Canada and Mexico were added — which makes sense, since Mexico already has a free trade agreement with the E.U., and Canada is in the final stages of negotiating one. Including them would avoid having different rules covering trade involving our two largest trading partners. The global reaction to Nafta 20 years ago shows that “competitive liberalization” can be a powerful catalyst. When governments see others taking economic action that generates growth and stability, they do not want to be left out. A broad, gold-standard trade agreement across the Atlantic could be such a catalyst for reigniting support for multilateral trade liberalization, bringing W.T.O. members back to the table to finish the Doha Round, which would give a real boost to the global economy. It was done before with the Nafta, and it could be done again with the successful conclusion of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

#### That’s key to global free trade.

**Suominen 9** fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States and trade economist at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington (Kati Suominen, March 2009, “A New Age Of Protectionism? The Economic Crisis And Transatlantic Trade Policy” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, http://www.gmfus.org/doc/Suominen%20final.pdf)//SL

The third issue of concern is multilateral negotiations in the Doha Round. A failure to successfully conclude Doha could freeze multilateral trade cooperation for several years. The consequent fate of global trade would depend on whatever scenario—spread of protectionism, unilateral liberalization, the rise of FTAs, and so on—developed in the vacuum left by a multilateral failure. Building on a prior work by Patrick Messerlin (2008), a November 2008 assessment by economists Antoine Bouët and David Laborde showed that in a scenario where all tariffs were brought back to bound levels, world trade would sink by $1.77 trillion, equivalent to a tenth of U.S. GDP, and welfare by $448 billion. In a less extreme scenario, whereby all tariffs, except preferences covered by FTAs, were moved to their applied levels at the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994 (bound tariffs are still capped by the Uruguay Round commitments), trade would drop by $728 billion and world GDP by $167 billion. The greatest gains and losses would be in agriculture. Many would see the proliferation of FTAs, currently the only active area of global trade policymaking, as the more likely scenario in the face of a Doha failure, but the trade creation provided by FTAs crucially hinges on the fortunes of multilateral most favored nation (MFN) opening. Further, proliferation of FTAs without some regional and multilateral vigilance and coordination could splinter the global trading system into miniblocs that forgo economies of scale. In contrast, a successful conclusion of the Doha Development Round would deliver trade gains of $336 billion and welfare gains of $79 billion annually.32 Admittedly, the figures on gains from a successful Doha Development Round are not staggering. But they are meaningful in light of the economic doldrums. And hundreds of billions of dollars of new trade would certainly ignite more economic activity than a trillion in lost trade. Even more importantly, concluding Doha is an antidote to bad trade policies and the ongoing (albeit still moderate) backtracking on trade policy commitments. It would be the single best way to demonstrate support for the multilateral trade agenda, a lock-in device for countries to commit to lowered barriers, and a signaling device to markets about the future direction of international trade policies. The standstill pledge by the G20 on a host of distortionary instruments is not enough. Recent months have shown that there are a great many ways in which countries can work around such a pledge and introduce distorting trade measures. In addition, quantitative studies do not account for the hammer blow that a Doha failure could deal to the very legitimacy of the bodies and rules of the multilateral trading system—MFN treatment, the dispute settlement mechanism, the attraction of WTO accession, the trade policy review process, and so on. Thus far, the global economic heavyweights have had an astonishingly good record in complying with the dispute settlement body’s verdicts, even when the claimant has been a small country that would have relatively little to hand, in terms of retaliatory tariff measures, that would be of economic significance to larger ones if they fail to comply (Levy 2007). This indicates that the members see a benefit in the WTO as an institution, and value the dispute settlement system. However, should trade talks fail to deliver further gains in terms of liberalization, the credibility of multilateralism could be eroded, and with that the interest in complying with dispute settlement rulings and a valuing of the WTO’s opinions. Further, some of the issues that should be dealt within the WTO context—those that have an immediate bearing on trade and that must be dealt with multilaterally, such as environmental regulations and the spread of FTAs—could be left by the wayside. A failure of the Doha Round would thus entail not only the loss of the static and dynamic gains from augmented economic exchange; it would also wreak havoc on the future of global trade and economic cooperation. Yet, such cooperation is even more imperative today because of the global economic downturn. A failure at the multilateral negotiating table would do little to inspire market confidence in a prompt global economic recovery, let alone in the ability of governments to come together to constructively deal with major issues. Trade cooperation is an economic and political lifeline that must and should not be severed.

#### Free trade averts war.

**JOE 10 -** United States Joint Forces Command Center for Joint Futures, informational arm of Department of Defense (Joint Operating Environment, “The JOE 2010”, 11/25/08; <http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2010/JOE_2010_o.pdf>)//Beddow

For the most part, the developed world recognizes that it has a major stake in the continuing progress of globalization. The same can be said for those moving into the developed world. Nevertheless, one should not ignore the histories and passions of popular opinion in these states as they make their appearance. One should not confuse developed world trappings for underlying stability and maturity of civil societies. **A more peaceful, cooperative world is possible only if the pace of globalization continues**. In particular, this means engaging China and other nations politically and culturally as they enter into the developed world. The critics of globalization often portray its dark side in the inequality of rich and poor. In some worst- case scenarios, they portray the rise of resentment and violence throughout the world as a direct result of globalization. Not surprisingly, the future is likely to contain both good and bad as globalization accelerates the pace of human interaction and extends its reach. Remittances sent home by emigrant workers are often overlooked as a facet of globalization, but represent the single biggest income source for developing nations. The total amount sent home by foreign workers exceeds the amount that the whole world spends on foreign aid and capital investments combined. For 2007, world-wide remittances were estimated by the World Bank at $318 billion, of which $240 billion went to developing countries. This estimate includes only remittances sent through formal banking channels; the actual amount is certainly much greater. Remittances are strategically important to developing countries for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that they provide a source of foreign exchange in addition to a stabilizing force for economies in turbulent times. The top three recipients of emigrant remittances in 2007 were: India, $27 billion; China, $25.7 billion; and Mexico, $25 billion. In the case of Mexico, remittances were the second largest source of hard currency after the sale of oil. These flows of money are generally resilient in economic downturns and add a measure of stability to families that would otherwise be at or near thresholds of poverty. Furthermore, remittances are spent in the local economy, providing business for shop owners and other parts of the local middle classes. However, as a prolonged economic downturn reduces work opportunities for emigrants, the reduction of this key source of income may also stunt the growth of the middle classes in developing countries, which are the driving force for the development and support of democratization and the rule of law, all of which are central to the evolution of stable and orderly states around the world. The processes propelling globalization over the next two decades could improve the lives of most of the world’s population, particularly for hundreds of millions of the poorest. **Serious violence resulting from economic trends has almost invariably arisen where economic and political systems have failed to meet rising expectations**. A failure of globalization would equate to a failure to meet those rising expectations. Thus, the real danger in a globalized world, where even the poorest have access to pictures and media portrayals of the developed world, l**ies in a reversal or halt to global prosperity. Such a possibility would lead individuals and nations to scramble for a greater share of shrinking wealth and resources, as they did in the 1930s** with the rise of Nazi Germany in Europe and Japan’s “co-prosperity sphere” in Asia. Admittedly, some will also be left behind by globalization, either through the misfortunes of geography, culture, or design. Many of these nations will be weak and failing states and will require an international array of economic, diplomatic, and military resources to establish or sustain stability. **In a globalized world of great nations, the United States may not always have to take the lead in handling the regional troubles that will arise.** By the 2030s, every region of the world will likely contain local economic powers or regional organizations capable of leadership. In any case, the United States will often find it prudent to play a cooperative or supporting role in military operations around the world and will almost certainly provide support in organizing or convening global coalitions for some time to come. In most cases the assisting of, or intervention in, failing states will require a cooperative engagement between the United States and regional powers. Again, the skills of a diplomat in working with other people and military organizations from different cultures must be in the tool kit of commanders, staffs, and personnel throughout the Joint Force.

## Plan

#### Thus the plan: The United States federal government should facilitate Mexico’s entrance into the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

#### We reserve the right to clarify.

## Solvency

#### TTIP will be fast tracked now

**Eizenstat 5/16** – Ambassador, US Co-chair of the Transatlantic Business Council, heads the international trade practice at Convington & Burling LLP, former chief White House domestic policy advisor to Jimmy Carter, former Clinton administration ambassador to the EU, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury (Stuart, 5/16/13; “Testimony of Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat 1 US Co -Chair, Transatlantic Business Council before The United States House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade” < http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com/uploads/file/cov.pdf>)//Beddow

Despite these positive factors and the enormous potential economic benefits of an agreement, we cannot ignore the difficulties that lie ahead, and which will likely result in it taking several years to complete a truly comprehensive agreement. First, each side has structural, political barriers that must be overcome. For the EU, as I saw personally in years of negotiations with the EU on a wide variety of subjects from trade to sanctions, negotiations with the European Commission must also take into account the particular interests of individual member states, especially in areas with the greatest potential benefit, like agricultural tariffs and regulations. On the US side, while it is not necessary to launch the negotiations or to negotiate in the early stages, the absence of Trade Promotion Authority will make an agreement very difficult and perhaps impossible to conclude. The EU will not want to negotiate a final accord with the Obama Administration and then have to negotiate all over again with the Congress. The EU must have confidence that what it negotiates with the Administration will be accepted by Congress, and only Trade Promotion Authority can assure this. **I feel certain the Administration will seek this sometime this year, and discussions are already underway between the Administration and Congressional leaders on trade, Chairman Baucus, Senator Hatch, Chairman Camp and Congressman Levin**. When they do so, they should be advised to seek the broadest possible authority, to include the TPP, TTIP, International Services Agreement, Information Technology Agreement, other bilateral agreements, and even a future multinational WTO agreement. At a recent TPP hearing in the Senate Finance Committee, leading Senators from Chairman Baucus to Ranking Member Senator Hatch seemed willing to support broad Fast Track Authority.

#### TTIP will pass, your disads are non-unique, and plan is popular.

**Barker and Workman 13** – director of Transatlantic relations, Bertelsmann Foundation/associate director, Global Business and Economics Program, Atlantic Council (Tyson and Garrett, “The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Ambitious but Achievable A Stakeholder Survey and Three Scenarios”, April 2013; < http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xbcr/SID-CA819006-5438477D/bst/xcms\_bst\_dms\_37655\_37656\_2.pdf>)//Beddow

The politics, for the moment, are good for a US-EU trade deal. In the United States, increasing trade with the EU has been received positively by Congress, organized labor, and the general public. Some members of Congress have already called for Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) for the TTIP discussions**. TPA would afford considerable room to maneuver to the US administration, and ensure that Congress, while retaining its ultimate oversight over international trade agreements, does not interfere with the minute details of the process.** Additionally, the AFL-CIO offered qualified support for a potential trade agreement, citing European Union member states’ “advanced economies, high national incomes, and well-developed legal and regulatory regimes designed to protect the environment and defend workers’ rights.” 5 Finally, a 2010 Pew Research Survey also found that American public support for increased trade with the EU remains high. 58 percent of those surveyed see it as advantageous for the United States compared to 28 percent who think it would negatively impact the US economy. 6 On March 20, **the Obama administration formally notified Congress of its intent to launch negotiations on the TTIP**, triggering a 90 day period during which it will consult Congress. Its aim is to guarantee consistency with legislative priorities and to hold “regular and rigorous” consultations with stakeholders. 7 The European Commission requested a formal negotiating mandate from the member states at the Council of Ministers meeting on March 12. The European Parliament will also subject the eventual agreement to an up or down vote. As the two sides begin these talks in earnest, the Bertelsmann Foundation and the Atlantic Council conducted a survey of stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic for their expectations on upcoming negotiations. Participants were asked to assess the likelihood, scope, and potential timetable of an agreement. They were then asked to rate a series of seventeen sectoral and horizontal issues expected to be part of TTIP talks on degree of importance to the success of negotiations and degree of difficulty of achieving agreement. The authors are aware of the limitations of such a survey, but it does present a valuable snapshot. Additionally, since discussions about the TTIP have focused on whether it is achievable or not, this issue-by-issue view may show policymakers the best avenues for moving forward. Based on the results of the survey, this paper outlines three possible scenarios of the TTIP negotiations: 1) a moderate agreement could be concluded that removes many barriers to trade and investment but avoids some of the most contentious issues; 2) the two sides could fail to secure even a basic deal as a focus on problematic issues thwarts movement on areas where they already largely agree; or 3) the United States and Europe could achieve a broad- ranging agreement relatively quickly if leaders are actively engaged. The Basics of an Agreement: Stakeholder Perceptions on If, When, and How Big On the most elemental question—whether an agreement would be concluded—the participants surveyed **provide a strong basis for optimism**, with an overwhelming 88 percent of respondents saying yes. In this sense, stakeholder sentiment seems consistent with final report of the US-EU High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) and public statements by leading officials.

# 2ac

### Case

#### European economic decline breaks up the EU and ends in war – their defense are deluded optimists and empirics are on our side.

**Groves 11 –** Dailymail reporter, citing Alain Juppe, former French Prime Minister and Angela Merkel, chancellor of Germany (Jason, “Europe’s debt crisis could trigger violent revolution and war, warns French foreign minister”, 12/1/11; < http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2068533/Europes-debt-crisis-trigger-violent-revolution-war-warns-French-foreign-minister.html>)//Beddow

**Europe is facing an ‘existential crisis’ that could end in violent revolution and war**, the French foreign minister warned last night. In the bleakest assessment yet of the euro crisis, Alain Juppe, a former French prime minister, said the spiralling debt crisis could trigger ‘the explosion of the European Union itself’. Mr Juppe told the French news magazine L’Express that the deepening crisis was **creating a dangerous breeding ground for violent nationalism, reminiscent of the 1930s.** He said: ‘This is an existential crisis for Europe that raises the spectre of a return to violent conflict on our continent. ‘This could call into question all that we have created, not only in the 20 years since the Maastricht Treaty, but since the foundation of the European community. ‘In that eventuality, everything becomes possible, even the worst. It could be the explosion of the European Union itself. ‘We have flattered ourselves for decades that we have eradicated the danger of conflict inside our continent, but let’s not be too sure. We’ve gone too far to not go further.’ Mr Juppe’s dire warning came just days after one of France’s leading economists said the single European currency only had a ‘50-50 chance’ of surviving until Christmas. Jacques Attali, the former president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, said ‘instant and urgent’ action was needed to prevent the euro from collapsing within weeks. Last month the German Chancellor Angela Merkel also warned that failure to resolve the euro crisis was a potential threat to peace and stability in Europe. But despite numerous ‘crisis summits’ in recent months EU leaders have been unable to agree a package that will satisfy the financial markets they are serious about shoring up ailing countries like Greece, Portugal and Italy and saving the euro.

### C02 ag

#### **No link**

**Strom 07** [Robert is the Planetary Science Emeritus Professor at the University of Arizona. He studied climate change for 15 years, the former Director of the Space Imagery Center, a NASA Regional Planetary Image Facility, “Hot House”, SpringerLink, p.<96-99 > ] H. Kenner
. However, contrary to predictions, increased CO2 only accelerates planet growth to about one-third ofwhat was expected. In fact, increased CO2 may have a positive feedback in that CO2 is absorbed less with increasing CO2 levels (Young et al., 2006). The stomata of leaves are the paris of a plant that “breathe” in CO2 and “exhale” oxygen. A new study shows that the level of CO2 in the atmosphere controls the opening and closing of leaf stomata (Young et al., 2006); the higher the concentration of CO2, the smaller the stomata opening and the less CO2 intake. The lower the CO2 abundance, the larger the opening and the more CO2 intake. A doubling of the CO2 abundance caused leaf stomata to close by about 20—40% in a variety of plant species, thus reducing the CO2 intake. Therefore, the increasing atmospheric abundance of CO2 will result in less CO2 uptake by plants, not more.

#### Co2 doesn’t boost yields – any growth is short-term and hypotheticalJackson 9 – Research molecular biologist @ USDA (Eric, 2009, “The international food system and the climate crisis,” The Panama News, Lexis)

A major weakness in the forecasts of the IPCC and others when it comes to agriculture is that their predictions accept a theory of “carbon fertilisation”, which argues that higher levels CO2 in the atmosphere will enhance photosynthesis in many key crops, and boost their yields. Recent studies show that this is a mirage. Not only does any initial acceleration in growth slow down significantly after a few days or weeks, but the increase in CO2 reduces nitrogen and protein in the leaves by more than 12 per cent. This means that, with climate change, there will be less protein for humans in major cereals such as wheat and rice. There will also be less nitrogen in the leaves for bugs, which means that bugs will eat more leaf, leading to important reductions in yield.

### T - conditional

#### We meet – negotiations establish conditions for TTIP.

#### Unconditional engagement is still ‘toward’ the country

**Haass and O’Sullivan, 2k** - \*Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution AND \*\*a Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution (Richard and Meghan, Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy, p.4)

As is evident from the fairly small existing literature on the use of incentives in foreign policy, many different engagement strategies exist, depending on such variables as the actors engaged, the incentives employed, and the objectives pursued. The first important distinction to be made in any typology of engagement is whether the strategy is conditional or unconditional. A strategy of unconditional engagement would offer certain changes in U.S. policy toward the country without the explicit agreement that a reciprocal act would follow. Depending on the intention behind these unconditional initiatives— and, of course, the reaction of the target country—this form of engagement may be short-lived. Charles Osgood, in his GRIT (graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction) theory offers a model of cooperation that stems from an uninvited, opening initiative by one country.8 Although the act in itself is unconditional, the failure of the target country to reciprocate with meaningful gestures soon leads to the abandonment of the strategy; alternatively, if the initial accommodating steps are met with positive moves, cooperation ensues. President George Bush’s 1991 nuclear reduction initiative, which was reciprocated by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, is one instance of a GRIT approach spurring cooperation. Conciliatory gestures made by the United States to Iran in March 2000 may be another. Another form of unconditional engagement takes a broader perspective, by regarding inducements offered to civil society and the private sector over time as playing an important role in creating openings for cooperation further down the road. In these unconditional strategies, certain initiatives or changes in U.S. policy toward the country are made without necessarily expecting, or even soliciting, reciprocal acts from the regime. This form of engagement may be implemented by nongovernmental actors, such as the programs sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy that promote democracy and the development of institutions in many authoritarian regimes. Alternatively, this engagement may entail explicit modifications to U.S. policy, as occurred with Cuba in March 1998 and January 1999. By allowing licensed sales of food and agricultural inputs to independent entities in Cuba, by easing travel and financial restrictions, and by promoting communication between America and the island, the United States sought to buttress the development of civil society and the private sector in Cuba.9 In doing so, the United States hoped to build momentum leading to greater political changes, which would facilitate U.S.-Cuban cooperation in the future, perhaps many years down the road.

#### Counter interpretation – Economic engagement may be either condo or uncondo.

Kahler, 6- Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego (M., “Strategic Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the Taiwan Strait” in Journal of Peace Research (2006), 43:5, p. 523-541, Sage Publications)

Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid pro quo on the part of the target country and policies that are unconditional.1 Conditional policies, sometimes labeled linkage or economic 'carrots', are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with economic loss (sanction) in the absence of policy change, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic benefits in return for desired policy change. Drezner (1999/2000) has proposed several plausible predictions regarding the employment of conditional strategies and the conditions of their success. He argues that the successful use of economic engagement is most likely between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used.¶ coercive threats are first used. ¶ The success of a conditional engagement strategy should also be contingent on a state's influence over domestic firms. If those firms find market-based transactions with the target state unappealing, a government pursuing a conditional strategy must convince them to deal with the target when desired change occurs. On the other hand, if domestic firms have strong economic incentives to conduct economic transactions with the target state, a successful conditional strategy must prevent them from pursuing their economic exchange in the absence of the desired change in a target states behavior. In this regard, democracies may have a harder time pursuing a conditional strategy: in a democratic setting, firms are likely to be openly critical of politicians who try to restrict their commercial activities and will support candidates who do not place such demands on them. Our first hypothesis (HI), therefore, is that conditional engagement strategies will be less likely to succeed if the initiating state is a democracy, especially when underlying economic incentives to trade with or invest in the target state are strong.2 ¶ Unconditional engagement strategies are more passive than conditional variants in that they do not include a specific quid pro quo. Rather, countries deploy economic links with an adversary in the hopes that economic interdependence itself will, over time, change the target's foreign policy behavior and yield a reduced threat of military conflict. How increased economic integration at the bilateral level might produce an improved bilateral political environment is not obvious. While most empirical studies on the subject find that increased economic ties tend to be associated with a reduced likelihood of military violence, no consensus explanation exists (e.g. Russett & Oneal, 2001; Oneal & Russett, 1999; for less sanguine results, see Barbieri, 1996). At a minimum, state leaders might seek to exploit two causal pathways by pursuing a policy of unconditional engagement: economic interdependence can act as a constraint on the foreign policy behavior of the target state, and economic interdependence can act as a transforming agent that reshapes the goals of the target state.

### Debt Ceiling

**N/U -**

#### Won’t pass – White House not pushing, Democrats not negotiating, Republicans not breaking.

**Weisenthal 9/25** – business insider executive editor, correspondant for dealbreaker.com (Joe, “Is a Debt Ceiling Crisis Way More Likely than the market is realizing?”, 9/25/13; < http://www.businessinsider.com/wait-is-the-market-way-too-optimistic-that-a-debt-ceiling-deal-is-going-to-happen-2013-9>)//Beddow

In an email to clients this morning, SocGen analyst Kit Juckes writes: There is a view in Washington that financial market participants are a bit too optimistic about the prospects for the US debt ceiling being raised. Guilty as charged. Observing a man holding a loaded shotgun, pointed at his own foot, I imagine common sense will prevail in time for tragedy to be avoided. And yet...... Juckes is correct here. There is definitely a gap between how Washington people feel about the debt ceiling and how participants in financial markets feel about it. Financial markets think it's all just noise. Washington types think it could be different this time. Back in July we highlighted the analysis of Eurasia Group's Sean West, who explained **the debt ceiling dynamics, arguing that there was no inclination on either side for negotiation or a deal. The White House won't negotiate, Democrats don't want to negotiate, and the GOP is stuck in its positions.** WSJ points out today that **the rise of a resurgent liberal wing in the Democratic party is giving Obama less room than ever to negotiate on fiscal issues.** At Wonkblog, they're talking about how 2013 could be worse than 2011. Ezra Klein and Evan Soltas: "There is, quite literally, no shared ground for a deal." Watch markets to see if the Washington view of things starts to take hold.

#### No impact – Obama will raise the debt limit through an XO

**Robb 9/25/13** Senior Washington Correspondent for MarketWatch (Greg Robb, 25 September 2013, “If all else fails, Obama will raise debt ceiling himself: analyst,” MarketWatch, http://blogs.marketwatch.com/capitolreport/2013/09/25/if-all-else-fails-obama-will-raise-debt-ceiling-himself-analyst/)//KP

If Congress fails to raise the debt limit by Oct. 17, could President Barack Obama step in and raise the ceiling by executive action? Greg Valliere, chief political strategist for Potomac Research Group, says Obama would do so, if faced with the prospect of a certain default on paying the nation’s creditors. “I am not flat out saying that [executive fiat] is the end game, but it has to be on the table if a default looks imminent,” Valliere said in an interview with MarketWatch. During the last debt ceiling showdown in the summer of 2011, there were scholars and senators who suggested Obama did have such a silver bullet — the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. None other than former President Bill Clinton agreed. In an interview with The New York Times in 2011, Clinton said Obama should invoke the 14th Amendment “without hesitation” to raise the debt ceiling and “force the courts to stop me.” The provision in question, Section 4 of the amendment, says that the validity of the public debt “shall not be questioned.” Laurence Tribe, a noted professor of constitutional law at Harvard, tried at the time to throw cold water on such arguments. In an op-ed in the Times, Tribe said that only Congress has the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States. Arguments that the president may do whatever is necessary to avoid default “has no logical stopping point,” Tribe noted. In addition, a legal cloud would hang over any newly issued bonds, Tribe said, because of the risk that the government might refuse to honor those debts as legitimate. Back in 2011, Obama and administration officials shied away from the suggestion he could act unilaterally. But Valliere noted that times have changed, with Obama now in his second term in office. “Obama has fewer constraints,” Valliere said.

#### 3) Plan popular – two warrants:

#### A) Republicans love free trade with Mexico.

**Palmer 12** – Reuters contributor (Doug, “Boehner urges deeper US engagement in Latin America”, 5/8/12; <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/08/usa-trade-boehner-idUSL1E8G81HM20120508>)//Beddow

WASHINGTON, May 8 (Reuters) - The U.S. **Congress' top Republican on Tuesday called for deeper U.S economic engagement with Latin America, but also expressed concern over Iranian influence in the region and the "alarming willingness" of some governments to abandon international norms**. "In both Colombia and Mexico, and the entire hemisphere, the U.S. must be clear that we will not disengage in the fight for free markets and free, secure people," U.S. House of Representatives Speaker John Boehner said in remarks prepared for delivery at the U.S. State Department. "We must be clear that we will be there, with our friends and partners in the region, committed to fighting and winning the war for a free, stable, and prosperous hemisphere," Boehner said, speaking to the Council of Americas, an organization representing companies that do business in the region. Boehner is due on Tuesday to receive an award from the group for his work last year on winning congressional approval of free trade agreements with Colombia, Panama and South Korea. The pacts were negotiated during the Republican administration of former President George W. Bush, but President Barack Obama, a Democrat, did not submit the agreements to Congress until late 2011, after negotiating changes to make them more palatable to Democrats and securing a commitment for renewal of a worker retraining program known as trade adjustment assistance. "When the Colombia Free Trade Agreement enters into force (on May 15), it will be an important moment for the prosperity of our hemisphere. It is equally important that the Panama Free Trade Agreement be fully implemented in the months ahead," Boehner said, referring to the Obama administration's ongoing work with Panama to implement that agreement. Boehner said it was important the United States "keep the momentum going" by negotiating new agreements to open markets to American exports, and said he was disappointed Obama has not sought legislation known as "Trade Promotion Authority" which would help the White House do that. Meanwhile, Boehner called Iran's attempt to gain influence in the region a "major threat" to democracy and prosperity. Iranian President Mahmoud Admadinejad's visit to Venezuela and Cuba "underscored the designs Iran has for expanding its influence in Latin America, and its eagerness to forge bonds with governments in the Western Hemisphere that have demonstrated a lesser interest in freedom and democracy," Boehner said. In an apparent reference to Argentina's expropriation of Spanish oil giant Repsol's subsidiary YPF and the billions in unpaid debt obligations the country still owes foreign investors, Boehner said the United States "must also be clear about what we expect from all of our neighbors." "We will insist that every nation honor the rule of law, meet its obligations, and respect international norms. That means paying debts to bondholders; honoring legal commitments and the decisions made by international arbiters; and respecting private property," Boehner said. "Some governments in the region have demonstrated an alarming willingness to drift away from such norms when it suits their objectives. When this occurs, it's harmful not only to the people of those countries, but to the potential of all of the Americas. And it cannot be excused."

#### B) TTIP has incredible bipartisan support – economic benefits and commitment to Europe.

**Rostowska 13** – contributor to Polish Institute of International Affairs (Maya, “Ripping into TTIP? Debates Surrounding the upcoming EU-U.S. Negotiations”, July 2013; < http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=32&ved=0CDMQFjABOB4&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pism.pl%2Ffiles%2F%3Fid\_plik%3D14298&ei=kQg1UsfKILXE4AOGgYEo&usg=AFQjCNEDtAf13ATF4LcEtDcEZ7jetuIXKg&sig2=FDL2nosbSp53J\_Jh1vdT-w&bvm=bv.52164340,d.dmg&cad=rja>)//Beddow

In the U.S., the office of the Trade Representative (USTR) will negotiate TTIP on behalf of the administration. The final draft of the text will be presented to Congress for approval, so broad political support for the agreement is necessary. From the start, **there were positive signs of bipartisan accord regarding the benefits of an FTA with the EU, with both Republican and Democratic representatives declaring their support for the agreement**.6 In fact, TTIP has been hailed as one of the few issues able to unite politicians across party lines in recent years. This unanimity is due to the general consensus that surrounds the economic boost that TTIP would bring to the U.S. Support from many representatives and senators is further guaranteed by the benefits that their home states (their home electorates) are likely to gain from the agreement. California, New York, Texas and Minnesota in particular are greatly dependent on EU trade and investment for employment and exports, and so would stand to greatly profit from TTIP. Beyond the economic benefits, geostrategic considerations are also spurring U.S. politicians to support TTIP. Indeed, some see a need to reassure their European partners, given the perceived U.S. “pivot to Asia.” At a House Ways and Means Committee hearing on the subject, Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, former U.S. envoy to the EU, testified that the agreement would provide an important signal of America’s continued dedication to Europe, with which it shares core values.7

#### 4) Winners win – specifically TTIP is spun as a legislative victory for Obama.

**Feldman 8/5** – leader of BakerHostetler’s international trade practice, advisor to governments, international organizations, corporations on matters of trade and international law, legal advisor to Canada in WTO cases, former Director of the Canadian-American Business Council and former Special Project Officer and Consultant in the US DoD, Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson and Danforth Foundations (Elliot J., “TPP, TTIP, and Congress: The Elephant in the Room”, 8/5/13; < http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8e28a110-e1e4-4302-8fbb-6876d2ade774>)//Beddow

Successful completion of either trade negotiation would deliver to the President a signature accomplishment. With a Senate whose Minority Leader said his sole objective was the defeat of this President and a House of Representatives that routinely rejects legislation approved in the Senate, it is difficult to imagine why anyone would expect Congress to deliver President Obama a signature achievement in international trade. Perhaps, understanding the odds, the President is unprepared to invest much capital in Congress for such doubtful support. Democratic Presidents often have more success with international trade deals than Republicans, if only because Democrats are presumed to be protectionist and Democratic support is particularly difficult to muster for free trade. When a Democratic President presents a free trade agreement (or legislation for trade liberalization), he can expect bipartisan support because his own caucus, typically reluctant about free trade, will not abandon him. For this reason, if no other, President Obama may expect approval of his negotiations after the fact. Such a calculation, however, with the present (and likely next) Congress would reflect exaggerated optimism.

#### 5) Politics are compartmentalized – polcap’s irrelevant

**Dickinson 9** – professor of political science at Middlebury College and taught previously at Harvard University where he worked under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt (5/26/09, Matthew, Presidential Power: A NonPartisan Analysis of Presidential Politics, “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power,” http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/, JMP

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

### Whiteness - silence

#### Perm solves – all texts exclude something – omission is not a link, rather a reason that telling the story in all ways is best

**Rorty 02** Richard Rorty, Professor of Comparative Literature at Stanford Peace Review, vol. 14, no. 2

I have no quarrel with Cornell's and pivak's claim that "what is missing in a literary text or historical narrative leaves its mark through the traces of its expulsion." For that seems simply to say that any text will presuppose the existence of people, things, and institutions that it hardly mentions. So the readers of a literary text will always be able to ask themselves questions such as: "Who prepared the sumptuous dinner the lovers enjoyed?" "How did they get the money to afford that meal?" The reader of a historical narrative will always be able to wonder about where the money to finance the war came from and about who got to decide whether the war would take place. "Expulsion," however, seems too pejorative a term for the fact that no text can answer all possible questions about its own background and its own presuppositions. Consider Captain Birch, the agent of the East Indian Company charged with persuading the Rani of Sirmur not to commit suicide. Spivak is not exactly "expelling" Captain Birch from her narrative by zeroing in on the Rani, even though she does not try to find out much about Birch's early days as a subaltern, nor about the feelings of pride or shame or exasperation he may have experienced in the course of his conversations with the Rani. In the case of Birch, Spivak does not try to "gently blow precarious ashes into their ghostly shape," nor does she speculate about the possible sublimity of his career. Nor should she. Spivak has her own fish to and her own witness to bear just as Kipling had his when he spun tales of the humiliations to which newly arrived subalterns were subjected in the regimental messes of the Raj. So do all authors of literary texts and historical narratives, and such texts and narratives should not always be read as disingenuous exercises in repression. They should be read as one version of a story that could have been told, and should be told, in many other ways.

### Death cult

#### Nukes are a real threat and discussing the danger is critical to averting extinction.

**Austin 85** – Sedgwick Associate Minister and lecturer on psychology (Dorothy A., “Reinventing Ourselves: The Spiritual Task of the Nuclear Age”, *Political Psychology,* Vol. 6, No. 2, June 1985)//Beddow

But beyond the participation of spiritual or religious leaders in the public discussion of nuclear arms policies, the Catholic bishops rightly recognize that the project of reinventing ourselves is a cultural project wider than the province of any one religious tradition or political party. It includes all of us whether or not we think of ourselves as “religious” in a traditional way. For the “spiritual” project is the **urgent necessity to transform the very structures of human consciousness in the face of possible human self-extinction.** Such a “spiritual” project is both psychohistorical and “mythic.” It involves a transformation of the human mind – the way we think about ourselves, the world, and “others” with whom we share the world, both in social and political terms and in mythological and ideological terms as well. Recently, I had a conversation with a high school student who was questioning the relationship between thinking and social transformation. "In what way can thinking change anything?" he wondered. He had just finished seeing the film, Gods of Metal, which portrays the way we prize and adore nuclear weapons for their technological brilliance. "We men can invent anything," he said to me. "We're awfully clever. Missiles that can hit a dinner plate in Moscow. Isn't it extraordinary what our minds can think up?" He stopped for a moment, before continuing, "I guess now that we've thought up the weapons, the next question is: Can we 'think up' ourselves? Can we reinvent ourselves as human beings? That's the question in my mind. Can we think our way out of this nightmare? Can we change our minds and let the other guy change his mind as well, before it's too late?" I mention this young man's remarks for several reasons. His question happens to be the principal subject of this paper: Can we-by taking thought - reinvent ourselves in the Nuclear Age? Can we teach ourselves to think about our predicament in new ways? Our predicament is that no generation before ours has ever held the life and death of the species in its hands. For the young man in high school there is the recognition that the extraordinary achievements in science and technology must be matched by an equally extraordinary achievement in human engineering. His is a thoughtful perspective, I would suggest, which acknowledges that our thinking must change. Here we see the mind of an adolescent philosopher hard at work. There is still another reason for mentioning this young man's remarks. I found myself moved by the fact that as soon as he had spoken, he became embarrassed by the expression of his own feelings. He said his feelings caused him to feel "unmanly." Moreover, he went on to say that he "suffered silently" from feeling that he would be seen as "hysterical" if he "really admitted how afraid" he was of "nuclear war." I mention this here because I think his feelings are indicative of several contemporary currents characteristic of psychological upheaval in the nuclear age: the psychological stress experienced by young people growing up in that age; the redefinition of "masculinity" and "femininity" within changing images of strength and security; and, the powerful societal taboo that surrounds the nuclear **predicament, a taboo that can readily render adolescents and adults quiescent on the subject of nuclear arms. It would appear to be the case, that social convention requires us to be "reasonable" and** not to behave as though we were in a state of global emergency or nuclear terror. As the psychiatrist Joel Kovel says, "Reasonableness has become institutionalized. It becomes a way authority has of asserting itself without resorting to coercion." Reasonable people, says Kovel, "do not ask impertinent questions. It never occurs to them to do so; and if anything too fundamental does manage to pass the consort of reasonableness, it is dismissed as being in poor taste. Reasonable people, then, do not challenge the bomb too vociferously. They shrug their shoulders with that cynical world-weariness which has always passed for practical wisdom and say, let the authorities, the experts, attend to it." (Kovel, 1983:220) The young man I spoke with explained to me that he was "confused" by the "mixed-message from adults," the message being **that humankind stands on the dangerous brink of annihilating itself; that we live in a state of global emergency which, as he put it, "should bring people to their senses so that we can have emergency meetings** between us and the Russians." What he could not understand was how we could "make more nuclear weapons every day even though we keep saying how dangerous they are. How is any- one expected to feel sane," he said. "I doubt that even God feels sane any- more when he looks down at what's happened to the world." Once again, this young man's philosophical attempts to make coherent, meaningful sense out of the world he is to inherit appear not to be sufficient, not in a world that could drive even God insane. However, the young man's fantasy, that even God cannot make sane sense of it all, at least puts the young philosopher in the good company of a transcendent, presumably ultimately all-knowing and wise figure. Together, they can wonder about human madness, while our young thinker thinks his thoughts with some sense of ultimate kinship.

### Pemex conditions CP

#### Conditions will fail

**Griffin 4/03/13** – the Harvard Crimson editorial writer, (JOHN Griffin, April 3, 2013, “Engage with Venezuela”, <http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/>)//GP

When Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez [died](http://www.theinternational.org/articles/370-the-rocky-us-venezuela-relationship-wh) in early February, his country was thrown into a period of national mourning as the political equilibrium in Latin America hung in the balance. As Venezuela chooses its next president, Washington should seek to reverse the current trend of acrid relations between the two nations and engage with the Venezuelan government in Caracas toward stability and prosperity in the Western hemisphere. While it might seem likely that relations between the United States and Venezuela would naturally improve after the death of the combative Chávez, the opposite now seems more [likely](http://www.albanyherald.com/news/2013/mar/06/chavez-death-unlikely-improve-us-venezuela-relatio/). Before passing away, Chávez had handpicked a successor in Nicholas Maduro, who has assumed power in the interim before the presidential election in April. As Chávez’s handpicked successor, Maduro has already continued with his mentor’s trend of using anti-American rhetoric to bring popularity to his government, even [declaring](http://www.albanyherald.com/news/2013/mar/06/chavez-death-unlikely-improve-us-venezuela-relatio/) that American agents may have infected Chávez with the cancer that killed him. While Washington has officially [declared](http://www.theinternational.org/articles/370-the-rocky-us-venezuela-relationship-wh) that it is committed to a more functional relationship with Venezuela, its actions have not been consistent with this idea: The United States offered no official condolences for Chávez’s death, and both nations have started [expelling](http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/11/us/venezuela-diplomats-expelled) diplomats from the other. Neither nation, it seems, is steering toward more congenial relations with the other. Admittedly, the United States has good reason to be less than enthused about more Chávez-style governance in Venezuela. [Calling](http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/international/americas/30venezuela.html?_r=0) himself a 21st-century socialist, Chávez [nationalized](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/09/world/americas/09venez.html) the lucrative oil industry, developed strong trade and diplomatic relationships with [Iran](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/07/us-venezuela-iran-idUSTRE8060DO20120107) and [Cuba](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/world/americas/15venez.html?pagewanted=all),[repeatedly](http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/americas/09/20/chavez.un/index.html) [decried](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/20/hugo-chavez-barack-obama-clown) the United States as an imperialist force, and [cooperated](http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/07/us-venezuela-iran-idUSTRE8060DO20120107) with the Iranians in developing nuclear technology. Engaging in petty diplomat-expulsion spats, however, is no way to deal with any of these problems, and it in fact only strengthens the Chavistas’ hold on their country. The diplomatic and economic opportunities that would stem from greater engagement would far outweigh the meager benefits reaped from our current policies. Diplomatically, positive engagement with Venezuela would be a major step toward building American credibility in the world at large, especially in Latin America. Chávez (along with his friends the Castros in Cuba) was able to [bolster](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-03/12/content_16300175.htm) regional support for his regime by pointing out the United States’ attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics. Soon, a number of populist governments in Latin America had rallied around Chávez and his anti-American policies. In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to [form](http://www.alba-tcp.org/) the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed (but never realized) by the Bush administration. Chávez galvanized these nations—many of whom have experienced American interventionist tactics—by vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chávez’s position. Every time Washington chastises Venezuela for opposing American interests or [attempts](http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/06/13/silly-sanctions-against-venezuela-boost-hugo-chavez/) to bring sanctions against the Latin American country, the leader in Caracas (whether it be Chávez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler. This weakens the United States’ diplomatic position, while simultaneously strengthening Venezuela’s. If Washington wants Latin America to stop its current trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less astringent tone in dealing with Venezuela. Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an aggressor, and Washington will in turn gain a better image in Latin America. Beyond leading to more amicable, cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be economically advisable. With the world’s largest oil [reserves](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-13/venezuela-overtakes-saudis-for-largest-oil-reserves-bp-says-1-.html), countless other valuable resources, and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically. Even now, America can see the possible benefits of economic engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation: Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated because of the [cooperation](http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/strange-bedfellows-venezuela-low-income-americans-warm/story?id=18650347#.UU9EnlvwJio) between Venezuela and a Boston-area oil company. Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America. It was mostly through Venezuela’s [efforts](http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/06/international/americas/06prexy.html?_r=0) that the United States was unable to create a “Free Trade Area of the Americas,” an endeavor that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade. In a world where the United States and Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from such agreements. For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best course of action for the United States. As it stands, the negative relationship between the countries has created an atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic cooperation nearly impossible. While there is [much](http://www.hrw.org/americas/venezuela) for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticized—authoritarian rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policies—nothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having any effect. The United States should stop playing “tough guy” with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We aren’t catching any flies with our vinegar—it’s high time we started trying to catch them with honey.

### Neolib

#### Perm do both – the alt is too vague, cedes the political, is impossible, results in genocide, and capitalism isn’t collapsing. Pragmatic action is key to overcoming utopianism.

**Zizek 12** – lol (Slavoj, “Don’t Act. Just Think.”, 7/8/12; <http://bigthink.com/videos/dont-act-just-think>)//Beddow

Capitalism is . . . and this, almost I’m tempted to say is what is great about it, although I’m very critical of it . . . Capitalism is more an ethical/religious category for me. It’s not true when people attack capitalists as egotists. “They don't care.” No! An ideal capitalist is someone who is ready, again, to stake his life, to risk everything just so that production grows, profit grows, capital circulates. His personal or her happiness is totally subordinated to this. This is what I think Walter Benjamin, the great Frankfurt School companion, thinker, had in mind when he said capitalism is a form of religion. You cannot explain, account for, a figure of a passionate capitalist, obsessed with expanded circulation, with rise of his company, in terms of personal happiness. I am, of course, fundamentally anti-capitalist. But let’s not have any illusions here. No. What shocks me is that most of the critics of today’s capitalism feel even embarrassed, that's my experience, when you confront them with a simple question, “Okay, we heard your story . . . protest horrible, big banks depriving us of billions, hundreds, thousands of billions of common people's money. . . . Okay, but what do you really want? What should replace the system?” And then you get one big confusion. You get either a general moralistic answer, like “People shouldn't serve money. Money should serve people.” Well, frankly, Hitler would have agreed with it, especially because he would say, “When people serve money, money’s controlled by Jews,” and so on, no? So either this or some kind of a vague connection, social democracy, or a simple moralistic critique, and so on and so on. So, you know, it’s easy **to be just formally anti-capitalist**, but what does it really mean? **It’s totally open**. This is why, as I always repeat, with all my sympathy for Occupy Wall Street movement, it’s result was . . . I call it a Bartleby lesson. Bartleby, of course, Herman Melville’s Bartleby, you know, who always answered his favorite “I would prefer not to” . . . The message of Occupy Wall Street is, I would prefer not to play the existing game. There is something fundamentally wrong with the system and the existing forms of institutionalized democracy are not strong enough to deal with problems. **Beyond this, they don't have an answer** and neither do I. For me, Occupy Wall Street is just a signal. It’s like clearing the table. Time to start thinking. The other thing, you know, it’s a little bit boring to listen to this **mantra of “Capitalism is in its last stage.” When this mantra started, if you read early critics of capitalism, I’m not kidding, a couple of decades before French Revolution, in late eighteenth century**. No, the miracle of capitalism is that it’s rotting in decay, but the more it’s rotting, the more it thrives. So, let’s confront that serious problem here. Also, let’s not remember--and I’m saying this as some kind of a communist--that the twentieth century **alternatives to capitalism and market miserably failed**. . . . Like, okay, in Soviet Union they did try to get rid of the predominance of money market economy. **The price they paid was a return to violent direct master and servant, direct domination**, like you no longer will even formally flee. You had to obey orders, a new authoritarian society. . . . And this is a serious problem: how to abolish market without regressing again into relations of servitude and domination. My advice would be--because I don't have simple answers--two things: (a) precisely to start thinking. Don't get caught into this pseudo-activist pressure. Do something. Let’s do it, and so on. So, no, the time is to think. I even provoked some of the leftist friends when I told them that if the famous Marxist formula was, “Philosophers have only interpreted the world; the time is to change it” . . . thesis 11 . . . , that maybe today we should say, “In the twentieth century, we maybe tried to change the world too quickly. The time is to interpret it again, to start thinking.” Second thing, I’m not saying people are suffering, enduring horrible things, that we should just sit and think, but we should be very careful what we do. Here, let me give you a surprising example. I think that, okay, it’s so fashionable today to be disappointed at President Obama, of course, but sometimes I’m a little bit shocked by this disappointment because what did the people expect, that he will introduce socialism in United States or what? But for example, the ongoing universal health care debate is an important one. This is a great thing. Why? Because, on the one hand, this debate which taxes the very roots of ordinary American ideology, you know, freedom of choice, states wants to take freedom from us and so on. I think this freedom of choice that Republicans attacking Obama are using, its pure ideology. But at the same time, universal health care is not some crazy, radically leftist notion. It’s something that exists all around and functions basically relatively well--Canada, most of Western European countries. So the beauty is to select a topic which touches the fundamentals of our ideology, but at the same time, we cannot be accused of promoting an impossible agenda--like abolish all private property or what. No, it’s something that can be done and is done relatively successfully and so on. So that would be my idea, to carefully select issues like this where we do stir up public debate but we cannot be accused of being utopians in the bad sense of the term.

#### Neoliberalism is the key lynchpin of American hegemony.

**Dumenil and Levy 07** – EconomiX-CNRS and PSE-CNRS (Gerard and Dominique, “Neoliberal Dynamics – Imperial Dynamics”, 5/25/7; <http://www.raumplanung.tu-dortmund.de/irpud/presom/fileadmin/docs/presom/external/WS_Paris_June_2007/Dumenil_Levy.pdf>)//Beddow

The financial hegemony, as in neoliberalism, corresponds to the new functionings of capitalism both domestically and internationally, with somewhat specific contents. Therefore, a distinction must be maintained between neoliberalism and globalization. Domestically, the neoliberal order is manifest in the discipline imposed to labor and management, and the new flows of income toward finance. The same is true internationally, though, as recalled above, free trade and the free movements of capital are crucial in the present functionings and transformation of the world economy. The main issue, from the 1990s onward, became the globalization of neoliberalism toward the periphery, i.e. , the extension of the hunting ground of international capital. By imperialism , we do not mean a stage of capitalism, as in Lenin's analysis 6 , but the relationship of subordination and exploitation which relates the countries of the periphery to the most advanced countries. (Imperialism itself undergoes successive stages in relation to the economical, social, and political features of the countries of the center and the periphery in each epoch of capitalism.) This domination and exploitation | whose eld is the international economy, and in which the interests of the ruling classes of each country are expressed by what remains \their" states, with potential rivalry | interacts with domestic patterns of exploitation in various controls and regulations that we cannot address here. Violence is always at issue within imperialist relations. Beyond the direct exercise of violence, the “simple" establishment of economic relationships between countries of very unequal development conveys, in itself, domination and exploitation. \Free trade" is already a vector of potential devastation. \Fair trade" among such countries would require a whole set of limitations and controls, at odd with the logic of capitalism. The system of imperialism also underwent important transformations. The major advanced capitalist countries are all engaged, under U.S. hegemony, in the preservation of their privileges in the World Economy. Since World War II, this imperial rule found its expression in constant and multifaceted actions, marked by two specific features: (1) the preservation and then unravelling of the traditional colonial patterns of domination and (2) the cold war. The disappearance of these two elements considerably modified and, in a sense, clarified the fundamental nature of imperialism. We give to hegemony a more speci c meaning (which echoes the historical antecedent of the league of Delos in ancient Greece) than that of domination. Imperialism is not the fact of a single country (the United States) but collective and hierarchical, in its relationship to other less developed countries and given the contradictions within the group of imperialist countries. This is what we precisely mean by hegemony. **The leadership is ensured by the United States and its grasp over the periphery is combined with a form of inter- imperialist domination within the group of imperialist countries.** (Obviously, the two levels of dominations are distinct in degrees and forms.) This is a simple framework of analysis, but crucial in the understanding of contemporary international power relationships. Incidentally, note that, referring to financial \hegemony", we give the same content to the notion, that of a two-tier domination process: the domination of finance over all capitalist classes and the collective rule over other classes. There are obviously political and military aspects to imperialism and hegemony, and this issue relates to the autonomy of the various states around the planet. Within international institutions, such as the United Nations, or military structures such as NATO, the hierarchy of powers is very strict. The United States control to a large extent the military power of Europe, and make constants e orts to secure such a coordinated military efficient order in various regions of the world. Although the definitions are distinct, there are obvious links between neoliberalism, globalization, and imperialism: 1. **A first illustration of this statement is that globalization, under its present forms, is a central aspect of neoliberalism and U.S. hegemony.** Besides the fall of the Soviet block, **the assertion of neoliberalism was a major factor in the strengthening of U.S. supremacy and, therefore, hegemony within imperialism, not their weakening**. Within the triad, both Europe and Japan were more a affected than the United States by the new course of capitalism. (This is due to structural reasons, notably the existence in Europe and Japan of models of development more at odds with neoliberal patterns: state intervention, importance of loans in the financing of investment, etc.) 2. It is analytically important to separate the configurations of power: (1) within class patterns and (2) between countries. For example, within neoliberalism, the former relates to financial hegemony and compromises; the latter, to the hierarchy among states. But these distinctions are not absolute. A first aspect of such overlapping patterns is that the state of the hegemonic power is obviously that of its ruling classes. A second aspect is that the world system of imperialism is also based on a class compromise among ruling classes of the United States, of other imperialist countries and Japan), and of countries of the periphery. For example, the ruling classes of countries of the periphery sold their public sector to transnational corporations; they freed the movements of their capitals to be able of exporting their capitals to the countries of the center, etc.

#### Rhetoric that questions hegemony weakens its resolve - we must embrace the mantle of the Neoliberal Empire to check every existential and systemic impact.

**Stokes 05** ­ - Professor International Security and Strategy at the Department of Politics at the University of Exeter, former member of the Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Penglai Vol. 26, No. 2, < http://kar.kent.ac.uk/964/1/yp99bj5nkhqn01la.pdf>)//Beddow

Moreover, the USA is invariably portrayed as a reluctant empire that has almost accidentally inherited the capacity for global power projection thanks to the preponderance of power left over from the superpower confrontation. America’s Empire was thus not desired nor sought, but was established almost by default with the extension and consolidation of empire in the post- 11 September era allegedly driven by defensive considerations to bring order to the zone of war within the Third World. Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s National Security Adviser, boldly declared that ‘the collapse of the Soviet Union and 9/11’ signified a major shift in ‘international politics’ with the post-11 September era providing the USA with the opportunity to ‘expand the number of democratic states’ in the Third World. 7 Robert Kaplan explained that there is ‘a positive side to Empire...It’s in some ways the most benign form of order’, as a **globally hegemonic USA provides the best hope there is for peace and stability**. 8 Sebastian Mallaby echoed Kaplan’s themes and argued that, in the post-11 September era, ‘anti-imperialist restraint’ on the part of the USA, which has allegedly characterised its foreign policy since ‘World War II’, is increasingly becoming ‘harder to sustain’. He continues that to protect itself against ‘terrorists, drug smugglers and other international criminals’ that find refuge in ‘failed states’, the USA must now acknowledge its ‘reluctantly’ imperial role in world order, and self-consciously adopt a ‘logic of neo-imperialism’ when dealing with Third World failed states. 9 Some analysts have even suggested that the lack of US Empire was the reason for the 11 September attacks. The Wall Street Journal ’s features editor, Max Boot, argued that ‘the Sept 11 attack was a result of insufficient American involvement and ambition; the solution is to be more expansive in our goals and more assertive in their implementation...**US imperialism—a liberal and humanitarian imperialism, to be sure, but imperialism all the same**—appears to have paid off in the Balkan**s’. He continued that the solution for ‘troubled lands’ in the developing world is a ‘sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets’.** 10 According to Stratfor, one of the USA’s leading corporate intelligence firms, ‘Sept 11 created an unintended momentum in US foreign policy that has led directly to empire- building...The United States...is an imperial power, not in the simplistic Leninist sense of seeking markets, but in the classical sense of being unable to secure its safety without controlling others. ’ 11 The US state is thus seen as an imperial state overseeing a global empire which brings benefits to both other Western states and also the inhabitants of war-torn states and regions via the US Empire’s core mission of forcible humanitarian interventions, democracy promotion, and the elimination of global terrorism. These themes have been echoed by US planners themselves. The pre- 9/11 draft 1992 Defense Planning Guidance ( DFG ) paper drawn up by then Under Secretary for Policy Paul Wolfowitz and US Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney was sent to military leaders and Defense Department heads to provide them with a geopolitical framework for interpreting the US role in the post-cold war era. The DFG argued that the USA’s ‘first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival’ in the post-cold war era. In so doing the USA should ‘endeavour to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia’. 12 Under the office of the current US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, private studies of past great empires have been conducted so as to ascertain ‘how they maintained their dominance’ and what the USA could learn from the ‘successes and failures of ancient powers’. 13 Richard Haass, the director of policy planning at the US Department of State, and the USA’s lead co- ordinator for post-Taliban Afghanistan, openly called for the re-conceptua- lisation of the USA as an imperial power within world order: ‘building and maintaining such an order would require sustained effort by the world’s most powerful actor, the United States. For it to be successful would in turn require that Americans re-conceive their role from one of a traditional nation-state to an imperial power.’ 14 Perhaps the clearest indication of this new imperial discourse, however, was the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy, which echoed the earlier 1992 DFG paper. In it the Bush administration committed itself to building up its military forces to deter any potential rival for world supremacy: ‘Our forces will be **strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build up in the hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States’. 15**

#### Capitalism is responsible for abolishing poverty.

**Gregory 11** – research editor at the Independent Institute and contributor to the Ludwig von Mises Institute of Economics and LewRockwell.com (Anthony, “Why Capitalism is worth defending”, 9/2/11; < http://mises.org/daily/5505>)//Beddow

As Obama demonizes the wealthy and pitches a dozen plans to restructure the economy, opponents of this program need a reminder of what exactly we're fighting for. We are resisting bureaucracy, central planning, and encroachments on our freedom and communities. But this does not get to the heart of the matter. We are not only an opposition movement, countering the president and his partisans' agenda. More fundamentally, we stand in defense of the greatest engine of material prosperity in human history, the fount of civilization, peace, and modernity: capitalism. Many regard "capitalism" as a dirty word, and it is tarnished most of all by its supposed guardians. Wall Street giants fancy themselves capitalists even as they live off the taxpayer and thrive on the state's gifts of privilege, inflation, and barriers to entry. In the military-industrial complex, they champion capitalism by name as they produce devices of murder for the state. In the Republican Party and every conservative institution, they talk it up while making such vast exceptions to the principle as to swallow it whole. When many think of capitalism, they think of the corporatist status quo, leading even some who favor economic freedom to abandon the term. But we should not abandon it. For one thing, most **opponents of capitalism** do not merely oppose Goldman Sachs or Halliburton or even McDonald's. Rather, they oppose free enterprise as a matter of principle. **They object to employers' liberty to hire and fire whom they want, at whatever wage is mutually arranged**. They protest the right of entrepreneurs to enter the market without restriction. They disapprove businesses designing infrastructure; providing energy, food, water and other necessary commodities; and running transportation without government meddling. They lament the rich getting richer, even through purely peaceful means. They oppose the freedom to engage in short selling, insider trading, hostile takeovers, and corporate mergers without the central state's blessing. **They begrudge the worker who dissents from the labor establishment**. It is exactly the anarchy of the free market they despise, not the consolidated state–big business nexus they most want to smash. For every liberal who hates monopoly capitalism for anything approaching the right reasons, there are ten who deplore the capitalism part of it more than the monopoly. It is simply a fact that capitalism, even hampered by the state, has dragged most of the world out of the pitiful poverty that characterized all of human existence for millennia. **It was industrialization that saved the common worker from the constant tedium of primitive agriculture**. It was the commodification of labor that doomed slavery, serfdom, and feudalism. **Capitalism is the liberator of women** and the benefactor of all children who enjoy time for study and play rather than endure uninterrupted toil on the farm. **Capitalism is the great mediator between tribes and nations, which first put aside their weapons and hatreds in the prospect of benefiting from mutual exchange**. A century ago, the Marxists acknowledged the productivity of capitalism and its preference to the feudalism it replaced, but predicted that the market would impoverish workers and lead to greater material scarcity. The opposite has happened and now the leftists attack capitalism mostly for other reasons: it produces too much and is wasteful, hurts the environment, exacerbates social divisions, isolates people from a spiritual awareness of their community, nation, or planet, and so on. But all the higher, more noble, less materialistic aspirations of humankind rest on material security. Even those who hate the market, whether they work in it or not, thrive on the wealth it generates. If Marx's buddy Engels hadn't been a factory manager, he would have lacked the leisure time needed to help concoct their destructive philosophy. Every social-science grad student; every Hollywood limousine liberal; every Christian Left do-gooder; everyone for whom socialism itself is the one religion; and every antimarket artist, scholar, philosopher, teacher, and theologian screams atop a soapbox produced by the very capitalist system he disparages. Everything we do in our lives — whether materialistic or of a nobler nature — we do in the comfort provided by the market. Meanwhile, **the very poorest in a modern capitalist system**, even one as corrupted by statism as the United States, **have it much better than all but the wealthiest people a century ago. These blessings are owed to capitalism, and** unleashing it further would finally erase poverty as we know it.

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### Schell

#### Extinction is a categorically different impact – forecloses any possibility of affirmation.

**Schell 82** – author, fellow at Yale University, anti-nuke activist (Jonathon, “The Fate of the Earth”, 1982, Stanford University Press, pp. 95-96)//Beddow

But it is clear that at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, which is to say the zone of risk of extinction. But the mere risk of **extinction** has a significance **that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than, that of any other risk**, and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account. Up to now, every risk has been contained within the frame of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but **an abyss in which all human purposes would be drowned for all time**. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risks that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history. To employ a mathematical analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a **fraction of infinity is still infinity**. In other words, once we learn that a holocaust *might* lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance. Therefore, although scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and **we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species.** In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the threat we now pose to the earth and to ourselves. In trying to describe the possible consequences of a nuclear holocaust, I have mentioned the limitless complexity of its effects on human society and on the ecosphere – a complexity that sometimes seems to be as great as that of life itself. But if these effects should lead to human extinction, then **all the complexity will give way to the utmost simplicity – the simplicity of nothingness**. We – the human race – shall cease to be.

### Eurocentrism

#### The neg’s stigmatization of Europe as the sole evil oversimplifies the world situation – conversely it raises Europe’s arrogance as the martyr that drives the world while ignoring other non-European problems

Bruckner **10** French writer (Pascal, 2010, *A Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism*, pg. 34-36, translated by Steven Rendall)

Thus we Euro-Americans are supposed to have only one obligation: endlessly atoning for what we have inflicted on other parts of humanity. How can we fail to see that this leads us to live off self-denunciation while taking a strange pride in being the worst? Self-denigration is all too clearly a form of indirect self-glorification. Evil can come only from us; other people are motivated by sympathy, good will, candor. This is the paternalism of the guilty conscience: seeing ourselves as the kings of infamy is still a way of staying on the crest of history. Since Freud we know that masochism is only a reversed sadism, a passion for domination turned against oneself. Europe is still messianic in a minor key, campaigning for its own weakness, exporting humility and wisdom.6 Its obvious scorn for itself does not conceal a very great infatuation. Barbarity is Europe’s great pride, which it acknowledges only in itself; it denies that others are barbarous, finding attenuating circumstances for them (which is a way of denying them all responsibility).¶ Thus it wants to be the sole seat of inhumanity in action and wears this evil disposition as its insignia as others wear their decorations. Even natural catastrophes do not escape our delusions of grandeur: there are always many analysts who see in the slightest hurricane, flood, or earthquake the perfidious hand of Euro-America. Regarding the tsunami in December 2004, some even saw the goddess Gaia rising from the ocean floor to punish our industrial civilization. Like prayer, self-accusation is a way of acting symbolically at a distance when one can do nothing. Megalomania without borders: by attributing all the misfortunes of the world to man, a certain kind of ecology shows an unbridled anthropocentrism that confirms our status as the “master and destroyer” of the planet. To think, for example, that tomorrow we will be able to determine whether we have rain or sunshine, that we will eclipse nature, is to relapse into the Promethean fantasy nourished by the most fanatical adepts of progress. We can, then, contest everything except our own depravity. A blatant case of imperialism in reverse. Decolonization has deprived us of our power, our economic influence is constantly decreasing, but in a colossal overestimation we continue to see ourselves as the evil center of gravity on which the universe depends.**¶** We need our clichés about the wretchedness of Africa, Asia, and Latin America to confirm the cliché about the predatory, murderous West. Our loud stigmatizations serve only to mask this wound to our self-esteem: we no longer make the laws. Other cultures know it but nonetheless continue to blame us in order to escape our judgment and call us, at the slightest tremor, “people in pith helmets telling other people what to do” (Vladimir Putin). If colonial independence’s record of achievement is at present problematic, there is no doubt that someday Africa will take off, and the Arab world as well, that they will cease to be objects of our compassion and become direct competitors, partners on equal terms. Then we will no longer be the “masters of the world” but only formerly well-off people with pale faces. The whole paradox of a sobered-up Europe is that it is no less arrogant than imperial Europe because it continues to project its categories on the rest of the world and childishly boasts that it is the origin of all the ills that beset mankind. Our superiority complex has taken refuge in the perpetual avowal of our sins, a strange way of inflating our puny selves to global dimensions.